Agencies
Services
Hearings
III. HEARINGS:
A. Timeliness
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). In this civil commitment case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a continuance to the State in order for the hospital to complete psychological testing on the respondent when the continuance did not exceed the 15 day limit imposed by Section 3-800.
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998), affirming on other grounds, 288 Ill. App. 3d 360, 680 N.E.2d 471, 223 Ill. Dec. 738 (2nd Dist. 1997). Although both the trial court’s admission and medication orders had expired and the case was moot, the Supreme Court relied on an exception to the mootness doctrine, and decided the merits of this case, because it involved an event of short duration, capable of repetition, but evading review. The Court did not rule, however, on the constitutionality of Section 3-806 of the Mental Health Code, as the Appellate Court had. Instead, the Court reversed the trial court’s orders because, inter alia, in violation of Section 2-107.1, the petition for admission and the petition for medication were not heard in separate hearings.
In re DeLong, 289 Ill. App. 3d 842, 682 N.E.2d 1189, 225 Ill. Dec. 112 (3rd Dist. 1997). The respondent appealed the trial court’s order for involuntary treatment because, inter alia, the petition for involuntary treatment and the petition for involuntary admission were decided in the same hearing. Finding that the State’s failure to follow the Code was neither waived nor harmless, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order.
In re Carmody, 210 Ill. App. 3d 782, 653 N.E.2d 977, 210 Ill. Dec. 782 (4th Dist. 1995). When determining whether the hearing on a petition for involuntary admission was properly held within 5 business days of the filing of the petition, as required by statute, courts are to exclude the day the petition was filed and any weekends or holidays. Using this method of calculation, the hearing in this case was held on the fifth day after the day the petition was filed, and thus, the hearing was timely.
In re Herbolsheimer, 272 Ill. App. 3d 140, 650 N.E.2d 287, 208 Ill. Dec. 830 (3rd Dist. 1995). Trial court did not err by holding one hearing on both the petition for involuntary admission and the petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. [Section 2-107.1 has since been amended to explicitly require separate hearings; see DeLong.]
In re Smoots, 253 Ill. App. 3d 718, 625 N.E.2d 832, 192 Ill. Dec. 677 (2nd Dist. 1993). During closing arguments of this civil commitment case, the respondent's counsel argued that the petition should be denied because the State had failed to file the required treatment plan. Sua sponte, the trial court judge continued the case for 14 days to allow the State time to do so. On appeal, the trial court's order was affirmed, the Appellate Court ruling that no abuse of discretion and no prejudice had occurred.
In re Servis, 250 Ill. App. 3d 885, 620 N.E.2d 467, 189 Ill. Dec. 499 (4th Dist. 1993). First petition dismissed as untimely and respondent ordered discharged; within 15 minutes an order for detention and examination entered; counsel advised respondent to remain on premises. "Although perhaps impractical, respondent could have left..." during this period; his voluntary action does not "compel [a conclusion that] he was not discharged." Hearing on second petition was timely.
In re Lanter, 216 Ill. App. 3d 972, 576 N.E.2d 1219, 160 Ill. Dec. 265 (4th Dist. 1991). Because the hearing was not held with five days of the filing of the petition for involuntary admission, the trial court's order for admission was reversed.
In re Johnson, 191 Ill. App. 3d 93, 546 N.E.2d 1176, 138 Ill. Dec. 121 (3d Dist. 1989). Section 3-611 requires hearing within five days of filing of petition and certificates.
In re Williams, 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 503 N.E.2d 816, 104 Ill. Dec. 954 (2d Dist. 1987). Delays in bringing case to jury trial do not necessarily preclude filing of future petitions for involuntary admission. Nothing in Section 3-800(b) indicates that such relief is available for judicial delay, and Appellate Court will not create remedies not found in the statute. Prior petition delays did not coerce respondent into waiving right to jury under Section 3-802.
In re Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 708, 489 N.E.2d 347, 95 Ill. Dec. 126 (3d Dist. 1986). NGRI respondent whose involuntary admission jury trial was delayed more than five months suffered a flagrant violation of Section 3-800(b) which allows no more than a fifteen day continuance except when respondent requests continuance.
State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct.App. 1982). Trial court loses jurisdiction when hearing set for date later than that required by statute.
People v. Leppert, 105 Ill. App. 3d 514, 434 N.E.2d 21, 61 Ill. Dec. 84 (2d Dist. 1982). While grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion of trial court, discretion is not to be exercised arbitrarily. Here, proceedings for involuntary admission of NGRI respondent were unduly rushed and respondent placed at unfair disadvantage when hearing proceeded despite having too little time to review physician's report which was required to be furnished to him.
B(1). Right to counsel: Timeliness of appointment
In re Jones/In re Wheeler, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 743 N.E.2d 1090, 252 Ill. Dec. 934 (5th Dist. 2001). Section 3-805 must be strictly complied with. Because the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the respondents' best interests, not an attorney to advocate for their wishes, the trial courts' orders were reversed.
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998), affirming on other grounds, 288 Ill. App. 3d 360, 680 N.E.2d 471, 223 Ill. Dec. 738 (2nd Dist. 1997). Although both the trial court’s admission and medication orders had expired and the case was moot, the Supreme Court relied on an exception to the mootness doctrine, and decided the merits of this case, because it involved an event of short duration, capable of repetition, but evading review. The Court did not rule, however, on the constitutionality of Section 3-806 of the Mental Health Code, as the Appellate Court had. Instead, the Court reversed the trial court’s orders because, inter alia, in violation of Section 3-805 and the respondent’s right to counsel, the public defender had been appointed to represent the respondent without a prior determination that she was unable to secure representation by either private counsel or counsel from the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission.
In re McMahon, 221 Ill. App. 3d 383, 581 N.E.2d 1208, 163 Ill. Dec. 785 (4th Dist. 1991). In this commitment case, the record did not clearly establish that counsel was appointed prior to the hearing as required. The Appellate Court ruled, however, that even if counsel had not been timely appointed, there was no prejudice to the respondent because counsel spoke with the respondent prior to the hearing and adequately cross examined the State's witness. Thus, the trial court's order for commitment was affirmed.
In re Biggs, 219 Ill. App. 3d 361, 579 N.E.2d 1170, 162 Ill. Dec. 356 (4th Dist. 1991). Although counsel was not appointed for the respondent until the day of the hearing, in violation of Section 3-805, the record suggested that counsel spoke to the respondent prior to the taking of evidence and otherwise had time to prepare for the hearing. Finding no prejudice from counsel's untimely appointment, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's order for involuntary admission.
In re Clarke, 200 Ill. App. 3d 365, 558 N.E.2d 719, 146 Ill. Dec. 756 (2d Dist. 1990). Counsel must be appointed when hearing is set, not at hearing, and failure to do so requires reversal and remand. Trial court's nunc pro tunc order insufficient to comply with Section 3-805.
In re Blume, 197 Ill. App. 3d 552, 554 N.E.2d 1100, 144 Ill. Dec. 61 (2d Dist. 1990). Pursuant to Section 3-805, counsel must be appointed at time matter is set for hearing to insure adequate time for preparation and effective assistance of counsel.
In re Grimes, 193 Ill. App. 3d 119, 549 N.E.2d 616, 139 Ill. Dec. 890 (3d Dist. 1990). Where record is silent as to when counsel was appointed, but where counsel appeared and record indicated counsel had conferred with respondent prior to hearing, the Appellate Court presumed appointment at time hearing date was set as required by Section 3-805.
In re Johnson, 191 Ill. App 3d 93, 546 N.E.2d 1176, 138 Ill. Dec.121 (3d Dist. 1989). Statute requires appointment of counsel at time matter is set for hearing.
In re Walters, 183 Ill. App. 3d 452, 539 N.E.2d 454, 132 Ill. Dec. 144 (3d Dist. 1989). Counsel must be appointed at time matter is set for hearing.
Harmless error/waiver rejected where affirmative showing that respondent sought and was denied opportunity to confer with counsel prior to day of hearing.
In re Elkow, 167 Ill. App. 3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Pursuant to Section 3-805, counsel must be appointed at time matter is set for hearing to insure adequate time for preparation and effective assistance of counsel.
B(2). Right to counsel: Waiver
In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310, 273 Ill. Dec. 1 (5th Dist. 2003). The standard for assessing the capacity to waive counsel is the same standard as assessing fitness to stand trial – the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceeding against her and the ability to assist an attorney in her defense.
In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310, 273 Ill. Dec. 1 (5th Dist. 2003). Trial court failed to make adequate inquiry into UST Respondent’s capacity to waive counsel in involuntary treatment action because it failed to question respondent about her basic understanding of the purpose of the hearing and the role of counsel which represent the minimum inquiries for a capacity determination.
In re Cathy M., 3. In the trial court, the respondent asked for a continuance so that her private attorney could represent her at her medication hearing. The trial court summarily denied that request, the hearing proceeded with the respondent being represented by the public defender, and involuntary medication was ordered. On appeal, the medication order was reversed; the respondent had named a specific private attorney, the trial court had failed to inquire into her ability to retain the private attorney, and the continuance had not been sought merely to delay the hearing.
In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d 476, 746 N.E.2d 769, 254 Ill. Dec. 1012 (2nd Dist. 2001). Although the trial court erred by failing to inquire into the respondent's capacity to waive counsel, this error was harmless because the record showed that the respondent knew the purpose of the hearing and, therefore, had capacity to waive counsel.
In re Dennis D., 303 Ill. App. 3d 442, 707 N.E.2d 667, 236 Ill. Dec. 540 (1st Dist. 1999). The respondent asked to represent himself and his attorney moved to withdraw. Without inquiring into, or explicitly ruling on, the respondent’s capacity to waive counsel, the trial court denied the motion. Because the respondent was presumed competent to waive his right to counsel, and because the record did not show otherwise, the trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw, and the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order for involuntary admission.
In re Yoder, 289 Ill. App. 3d 465, 682 N.E.2d 753, 225 Ill. Dec. 9 (5th Dist. 1997). Having previously been committed, the recipient of services filed a petition for discharge. It was denied, and he appealed. Although the Appellate Court reversed on other grounds, the Court ruled that the trial court had not erred in denying the respondent's request to waive counsel; even though the trial court made no inquiry into the recipient’s capacity at this hearing, the trial court had found the recipient incapable of waiving counsel at his prior commitment hearing.
In re Denby, 273 Ill. App. 3d 287, 653 N.E.2d 73, 210 Ill. Dec. 486 (4th Dist. 1995). Respondent not prejudiced by waiver of counsel, even though court made no inquiry into competency to waive, where guardian and trial court questioned witness. "Better policy" would be to conduct inquiry, but reversal not required here. Tiffin and Click distinguished.
In re Tiffin , 269 Ill. App. 3d 581, 646 N.E.2d 285, 206 Ill. Dec. 918 (4th Dist. 1995). Trial court abused discretion in allowing respondent to proceed pro se. Respondent was prejudiced by trial court's failure to inquire into his knowledge of consequences of waiving right to counsel. His cross-examination of State's witness and objections were irrelevant, and these deficiencies were particularly noticeable because the State's case was not strong.
In re Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d 413, 554 N.E.2d 494, 143 Ill. Dec. 559 (4th Dist. 1990). Waiver of right to counsel must be demonstrably knowing and voluntary.
Error to deny pro se respondent full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Trial court has special obligations to pro se litigant due to his lack of knowledge of procedural and substantive requirements.
In re Tuntland, 71 Ill. App. 3d 523, 390 N.E.2d 11, 28 Ill. Dec. 29 (1st Dist. 1979). The respondent asked to represent himself, and the trial court allowed him to do so but also appointed the public defender to "guide" the respondent. The respondent interrupted the State's witness's direct examination with objections and cross examined them. On appeal, the Court ruled that the respondent had received the effective assistance of counsel and that any error was harmless given evidence that the respondent believed that Hitler was alive and that the respondent intended to obtain a weapon in order to kill him.
People v. Boswell, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 379 N.E.2d 658, 19 Ill. Dec. 786 (1st Dist. 1978). Pro se respondent must be given opportunity to present defense.
Where there was no manifestation of intent to waive presentation of defense and record reflected abrupt termination of proceedings by trial court at close of state's case, court could not presume that respondent waived right to present a defense.
People v. Lindsey, 17 Ill. App. 3d 137, 308 N.E.2d 111 (1st Dist. 1974). Finding of waiver of right to counsel not to be lightly made, and requires intelligent and knowing waiver pursuant to inquiry by court.
When granting leave to conduct own defense, court could require defendant to elect between pro se representation and assistance of counsel, rather than pro se with assistance of appointed counsel who was required to "stand by" for that purpose. (The ISBA's Committee on Ethics, in Opinion No. 90-14 (1/29/91), states that requiring appointed counsel to "assist" a pro se respondent is essentially an attempt by the court to limit the attorney's responsibility and is an "unjustified direction or regulation of the attorney's independent professional judgment, which is prohibited by Rule [of Professional Conduct] 5.4(c)." The Committee noted that where the client's ability to make adequately considered decisions is impaired, the lawyer "shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship." Rule 1.14(a).)
B(3). Right to counsel: Ineffective assistance
In re Carmody, 210 Ill. App. 3d 782, 653 N.E.2d 977, 210 Ill. Dec. 782 (4th Dist. 1995). Section 3-805 of the Mental Health Code guarantees respondents the right to counsel; this right to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. To determine whether respondents have been given effective assistance in involuntary admission proceedings, the Appellate Court adopts the Strickland test.
In re Estate of Ohlman , 259 Ill. App. 3d 120, 630 N.E.2d 1133, 197 Ill. Dec. 9 (1st Dist. 1994). Where trial court appointed attorney to serve also in capacity of GAL, respondent's desire to represent herself should not have been granted. Evidence demonstrated that respondent was totally without understanding or capacity to make responsible decisions; her testimony should have demonstrated to court that she could not protect herself and needed assistance. Attorney advanced her right to act pro se but failed to advise court of need to appoint separate GAL who could advise court that respondent's request could be contrary to her interests.
People v. Meier, 223 Ill. App. 3d 490, 585 N.E.2d 232, 165 Ill. Dec. 836 (5th Dist. 1993). Where outright dismissal of charges would be the result and no indication of strategic or tactical considerations, ineffective assistance has occurred.
People v. Jackson, 243 111. App. 3d 1026, 614 N.E.2d 94, 184 Ill. Dec. 893 (1st Dist. 1993). Conflict of interest between defendant and attorney does not automatically follow merely because defendant claims ineffective assistance or, as here, defendant files ARDC complaint. However, trial court must inquire as to merit of underlying factual matters of defendant's complaint, to determine if it is "spurious or pertaining only to trial tactics" or whether counsel has "neglected defendant's case". If the latter, "the court should appoint new counsel to argue defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel [at the post-trial stage]."
People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 543 N.E.2d 1290, 135 Ill. Dec. 543 (1989). In some instances, the elements of ineffectiveness demonstrate so great a likelihood of prejudice to the client's interest that prejudice may be presumed; e.g., where counsel entirely fails to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing.
People v. Sagstetter, 177 Ill. App. 3d 982, 532 N.E.2d 1029, 127 Ill. Dec. 200 (2d Dist. 1988). Ineffective assistance where, inter alia, mere perusal of MHDD Confidentiality Act would have made counsel aware of prohibition of certain testimony, i.e., statements to therapist during counseling. Failure to make timely objection resulted in failure to preserve issue of statement's admissibility at sentencing hearing for appeal.
People v. Bell, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 505 N.E.2d 365, 106 Ill. Dec. 59 (3d Dist. 1987). Cumulative effect of counsel's errors deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 85 Ill. Dec. 441 (1984). To show ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that but for the alleged errors the result would probably have been different.
In re Nolan, 66 Ill. App. 3d 744, 384 N.E.2d 134, 23 Ill. Dec. 498 (1st Dist. 1978). After the respondent was called as an adverse witness in his civil commitment hearing, he appealed and complained that this procedure denied him his constitutional rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel. Stating only that the respondent's constitutional arguments blurred the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings, the Appellate Court rejected them. The Court also rejected the argument the Mental Health Code conflicted with, and should therefore supersede, Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act. Thus, the trial court's order for commitment was affirmed.
In re Gerich, 22 Ill. App. 3d 575, 317 N.E.2d 724 (1st Dist. 1974). The respondent, who was hearing impaired and communicated only in writing, alleged on appeal that his trial counsel had not cross examined the State's witnesses and had not acted as his advocate. The Appellate Court found that the respondent, however, had received the effective assistance of counsel "in view of the limitations that existed."
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (N.D.Ala. 1974). Counsel should provide zealous advocacy, and even if actions may be viewed as charitable or good, deprivation of right to effective assistance may occur.
B(4). Right to counsel: In general
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting respondent’s counsel from participating in an “ex parte” hearing addressing state's request for order for respondent's temporary detention and evaluation in its second involuntary admission proceeding. The temporary detention by court order was considered an emergency hearing, which, due to its nature, is normally conducted on an ex parte basis.
U.S. ex rel, Alvine v. Chester Mental Health Ctr., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17359, 2004 WL 1899997, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated by lack of counsel's presence at a pre-sentence competency examination. A competency examination is not an adversary stage of the proceedings.
In re Jones, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 743 N.E.2d 1090, 252 Ill. Dec. 934 (5th Dist. 2001) Respondents in involuntary commitment and involuntary administration of authorized treatment are entitled to the appointment of counsel rather than a guardian ad litem.
In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310, 273 Ill. Dec. 1 (5th Dist. 2003). Respondent in involuntary treatment action has a right to counsel of her choice.
C(1). Right to Trial by Jury: Timeliness/Form of demand
In re David D., 307 Ill. App. 3d 30, 716 N.E.2d 1245, 240 Ill. Dec. 298 (2nd Dist. 1999). There was no evidence in the record that the respondent knew that he could make a jury demand, and none of the participants in his hearing for involuntary admission mentioned that a jury was a possibility. Nonetheless, the Appellate Court ruled that, because the respondent did not ask for a jury, the trial court did not err in conducting a bench trial.
In re M.A., 293 Ill. App. 3d 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill. Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). In this consolidated case, after declining to apply the mootness doctrine, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s order for admission but reversed the order for treatment. The order for treatment was reversed because, after de novo review, the Court determined that a written jury demand was not required and that the trial court improperly ignored the respondent’s timely oral manifestation of her wish to have a jury trial.
In re Yoder, 289 Ill. App. 3d 465, 682 N.E.2d 753, 225 Ill. Dec. 9 (5th Dist. 1997). The trial court erred, and its order denying the recipient's petition for discharge was reversed, because the trial court improperly denied the recipient’s requests for an independent examination and for a jury trial because the Code provisions governing these rights, Sections 3-802 and 3-804, both apply with equal force in hearings on petitions for admission and hearings on petitions for discharge.
In re Dryjanski, 282 Ill. App. 3d 161, 668 N.E.2d 616, 218 Ill. Dec. 132 (2nd Dist. 1996). After the respondent’s counsel’s motion for a continuance was denied, counsel made an oral jury demand. This request, too, was denied and, after the trial court ordered the respondent’s involuntary admission, the respondent appealed. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the oral request was sufficient and timely, having been made before opening statements and the hearing of testimony.
In re Brazelton, 245 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 615 N.E.2d 406, 185 Ill. Dec. 847 (4th Dist. 1993). Article VIII of Chapter 3 of the Code applies to hearings held pursuant to Section 2-07.1, and thus, even though the State had met its burden of proving the statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence, refusal of jury request requires reversal and remand. Here court failed to exercise any discretion when faced with jury request less than a week prior to expiration of 30-day hearing period.
In re DeJesus, 263 Ill. App. 3d 487, 636 N.E.2d 112, 200 Ill. Dec. 921 (5th Dist. 1994). Relying on Brazelton, the Court reversed the trial court's order for medication because the respondent was improperly denied her right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Section 2-107.1 and 3-802.
Pecoraro v. Kesner, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 578 N.E.2d 53, 160 Ill. Dec. 874 (1st Dist. 1991). Statutes regarding right to jury trial should be liberally construed in favor of allowing this right, and the inclination of the court should be to protect and enforce it.
In re Williams, 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 503 N.E.2d 816, 104 Ill. Dec. 954 (2d Dist. 1987). Prior delays did not coerce respondent into waiving right to jury under 3-802; right exists only if it is requested. Here it was offered and waived. Timely demand can be granted, even if orally made, as court may call special jury as necessary.
In re James, 67 Ill. App. 3d 49, 384 N.E.2d 573, 23 Ill. Dec. 779 (3rd Dist. 1978). The respondent, through a friend, requested trial by jury and that request was never withdrawn. Nonetheless, she was committed in a bench trial. Because the respondent was denied the statutory right to a jury, the trial court's commitment order was reversed.
In re Bradley, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1st Dist. 1974). Because the right to a jury trial in civil commitment hearings is statutory, not constitutional (see People ex rel. Keith, 38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967)), there was no error when a bench trial was conducted because the respondent had not requested a jury trial.
In re Gerich, 22 Ill. App. 3d 575, 317 N.E.2d 724 (1st Dist. 1974). After being committed following a bench trial, the respondent appealed, arguing, inter alia, that he had not been advised of his right to ask for a jury trial. Because the Mental Health Code allows for a jury trial only if requested, and because the respondent did not request a jury trial, the Appellate Court found no error and affirmed the commitment order.
C(2). Right to Trial by Jury: Jury instructions
In re R.W., 332 Ill. App. 3d 901, 266 Ill. Dec. 762, 775 N.E.2d 602 (5th Dist. 2002). The respondent appealed the trial court's order for involuntary medication, alleging two errors in the instructions given the jury: (1) although "disruptive behavior" had been deleted from Section 2-107.1, "disruptive behavior" was nonetheless included in the instructions as a basis for ordering involuntary medication and (2) a definition of "clear and convincing evidence" was not included in the instructions. Because the respondent's trial counsel had not objected to the "disruptive" instruction, the Appellate Court found that this error had been waived. And, disagreeing with the 2nd District's Timothy H., the 5th District found that "clear and convincing" was readily understandable; thus, where a defining instruction had not been tendered by either of the parties, the trial court was not required to tender such an instruction on its own initiative.
In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 739 N.E.2d 607, 250 Ill. Dec. 844 (2nd Dist. 2000). Applying an exception to the mootness doctrine, and the plain error rule, the Appellate Court reviewed the adequacy of the jury instructions and the verdict form used in this hearing for involuntary medication. First, the Court ruled that, although the "better practice" would be to give an instruction that the respondent was presumed competent to refuse unwanted medication, the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to give such an instruction sua sponte. Similarly, although the respondent would have been "entitled" to a limiting instruction upon request, the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to give such an instruction sua sponte. However, the respondent was denied her right to a fair trial because the verdict form was a general one and did not allow the jury to determine the benefits and risks of each of the various medications listed in the petition. Thus, the trial court's order was reversed.
In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 704 N.E.2d 943, 235 Ill. Dec. 370 (2nd Dist. 1999). After a jury trial, the respondent challenged the order for involuntary treatment because (1) there was no verbatim transcript of the voir dire and (2) the jury was not given an instruction defining the standard of proof “clear and convincing.” Although the case was moot, the Court reached the merits by applying an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court “strongly suggested” that transcripts be made of all future voir dires, but refused to reverse this case on that issue because the record did not disclose whether or not the respondent had explicitly waived the transcript in the trial court. The Court, however, found that the respondent was denied his due process right to a fair trial due to the missing instruction and reversed the trial court on that ground. The Court held that, for the jury to be adequately instructed in mental health cases, the jury must be instructed, sua sponte if necessary, regarding the elements of the petitioner’s case, the burden of proof, and the definition of the applicable standard of proof.
D. Right to be present/Location of hearing
In re Robert R. , 338 Ill. App 3d 343, 788 N.E.2d 122, 272 Ill. Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 2003). 3-806 requires the trial court to make a reasonable accommodation of any request concerning the location of a hearing; requests which would compromise security of court and hospital personnel and potentially burden the court are not reasonable and need not be accommodated.
Express waiver of respondent’s presence at involuntary treatment hearing is not required where respondent’s refusal to attend was voluntary and knowing.
In re Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d 203, 749 N.E.2d 1082, 255 Ill. Dec. 600 (2nd Dist. 2001). The respondent waived her right to attend her involuntary medication hearing, and the doctor testified that her absence was evidence of her disorganized thought, a symptom of mental illness. The State's Attorney then repeated that testimony in his closing statement to the jury. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary medication, ruling that both the respondent's statutory and constitutional rights had been violated by the State's attempt to create an inference that, because the respondent failed to attend, she was mentally ill and in need of involuntary treatment.
In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d 755, 690 N.E.2d 1058, 229 Ill. Dec. 11 (4th Dist. 1998). The respondent appealed the trial court's order for his involuntary admission because he had not been present at the hearing. The Appellate Court invalidated on constitutional grounds Section 3-806(a) because it improperly allowed an attorney to waive the respondent's right to be present; but, after assuming that attorneys would advise their clients of the consequences of refusing to attend, the Court upheld Section 3-806(b), found this section properly allowed the admission hearing to proceed in the respondent's absence, and affirmed the trial court's order.
In re Barbara H., 288 Ill. App. 3d 360, 680 N.E.2d 471, 223 Ill. Dec. 738 (2nd Dist. 1997), affirmed on other grounds, 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998). In reversing the trial court’s orders for involuntary admission and treatment, entered after a hearing held in the respondent’s absence, the Appellate Court struck down Section 3-806 as unconstitutional. Subsection (a) was held unconstitutional because it allowed the respondent’s attorney to waive the respondent’s right to be present, a decision properly made only by the respondent. Subsection (b) was also held unconstitutional because if allowed hearings to be held upon the respondent’s mere refusal to attend, without requiring that the refusal be made with the knowledge that the hearing could be conducted in the respondent’s absence. [In light of the Supreme Court’s review of this decision, this decision probably has little, if any, precedential value.]
In re Branning, 285 Ill. App. 3d 405, 674 N.E.2d 463, 220 Ill. Dec. 920 (4th Dist. 1997). The Appellate Court ruled that Section 2-110 is unconstitutional because, in violation of the guarantee of procedural due process, that section allowed the trial court to authorize the involuntary administration of ECT without requiring a hearing at which the respondent had the right to be present. [ECT is now governed by Section 2-107.1.]
People v. Carlson, 221 Ill. App. 3d 445, 582 N.E.2d 215, 164 Ill. Dec. 7 (5th Dist. 1991). Failure of record to indicate defendant's presence at hearing, and reviewing court's lack of authority to make any such presumption, requires reversal and remand.
In re James, 67 Ill. App. 3d 49, 384 N.E.2d 573, 23 Ill. Dec. 779 (3rd Dist. 1978). Because the trial court excluded the respondent from the courtroom during the doctor's testimony, without first determining that her presence would be harmful, the trial court denied the respondent the statutory right to attend her commitment hearing. As a result, the trial court' order for commitment was reversed.
E. Witnesses/Testimony
In re Joseph S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 599, 791 N.E.2d 80, 274 Ill. Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 2003). A finder of fact is not bound by an expert opinion on an ultimate issue, but may look “behind” the opinion to examine the underlying facts. It is within the trial court’s power to determine witness credibility.
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). [ In re Michelle J., 336 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 785 N.E.2d 133,271 Ill. Dec. 482 (5th Dist. 2003). Appellate Court reversed in part, affirmed in part by Illinois Supreme Court.] In this case, the court found that 405 ILCS 5/3-807 precludes involuntary admission unless at least one psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who has examined the respondent testifies in person at the hearing. Where the expert has not personally examined a respondent in connection with the current case and the respondent’s present situation, 3-807 requirements are not met.
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). The court found that statutory mandates cannot be compromised simply to accommodate the convenience of the State’s witness.
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). Where the expert testified that she served as consultant to [the patient’s] treatment team and was able to meet with [the patient] personally in a group session . . . we cannot say that the requirements of section 3-807 were not satisfied.
In re Joseph S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 599, 791 N.E.2d 80, 274 Ill. Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 2003). Expert opinions must be supported by facts and are only as valid as the facts underlying them. Citing with approval In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 217 Ill. Dec. 631, 667 N.E.2d 720 (2nd Dist. 1996).
In re Michelle J., 336 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 785 N.E.2d 133,271 Ill. Dec. 482 (5th Dist. 2003)
Where evidence clearly and convincingly shows respondent is subject to involuntary admission, where expert who testifies at hearing attempted to interview respondent but was unable to do so based upon her impaired condition, and where expert observed respondent, reviewed her chart and record, and consulted with staff who observed respondent daily, an examination pursuant to 3-807 has been performed.
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). According to the Appellate Court in its review of this civil commitment case, the State is statutorily required to provide, in the petition, the names of witnesses who could testify to the events alleged in the petition. But, if the trial court allows a witness to testify, even though he was not named in the petition, the court does not abuse its discretion "where the identity of such witnesses is disclosed elsewhere on the face of the petition" or where the identity of such witnesses could be ascertained by counsel's "due diligence" and no undue prejudice is shown. Here, even though the petition referred only to an unnamed "caseworker," that caseworker was allowed to testify at the hearing, and the trial court's order for admission was affirmed on appeal.
In re E.L., 316 Ill. App. 3d 598, 736 N.E.2d 1189, 249 Ill. Dec. 751 (1st Dist. 2000). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary medication because, abusing his discretion, the trial court judge refused to consider evidence regarding events that occurred after the filing of the petition. "Similar to a determination finding someone subject to involuntary admission, a determination authorizing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication should include a current evaluation of the respondent's present conduct and state of mind."
In re Michael D., 306 Ill. App. 3d 25, 713 N.E.2d 724, 239 Ill. Dec. 193 (1st Dist. 1999). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for admission because, inter alia, the trial court had denied the respondent’s counsel the opportunity to use notes from the respondent’s hospital chart during her cross-examination of the State’s psychiatrist, even though the expert had relied on the chart in forming her opinion. Additionally, the trial court had denied the respondent’s counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s social worker regarding alternatives to hospitalization. These limits on counsel prejudiced the respondent and required reversal.
In re Robert H., 302 Ill. App. 3d 980, 707 N.E.2d 264 236 Ill. Dec. 419 (2nd Dist. 1999). As a general rule, trial courts are not to admit evidence of a person’s prior wrongful conduct when that evidence is intended to show the person’s propensity to commit other wrongful acts. Recognizing that rule, but declining to apply it in this civil commitment case, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that the respondent had killed his neighbor more than 20 years ago.
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998), affirming on other grounds, 288 Ill. App. 3d 360, 680 N.E.2d 471, 223 Ill. Dec. 738 (2nd Dist. 1997). The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s orders for admission and medication because, inter alia, in violation of Section 3-807, the State’s expert witness had not personally examined the respondent during her current hospitalization.
In re Edward S., 298 Ill. App. 3d 162, 698 N.E.2d 186, 232 Ill. Dec. 348 (2nd Dist. 1998). Expert witness's testimony that, according to the patient's hospital record, another doctor had advised the patient of the treatment's risks and benefits, provided no evidence that patient had, in fact, been given the required information.
Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories. Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335 (S.D.Ind. 1992) aff'd. 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993). For trial court to confidently rely upon expert testimony, testimony must be based upon scientific knowledge that will assist the court in understanding a fact in issue. It is not admissible if it lacks basis in prerequisite scientific knowledge, and may not be based upon subjective belief or prophecy. "An expert's mere guess or conjecture is properly excluded because an expert is a conduit of facts and not merely a subjective speculator relying on stature alone."
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). Psychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.
Kniceley v. Migala, 272 Ill. App. 3d 427, 626 N.E.2d 238, 193 Ill. Dec. 205 (2d Dist 1993). Erroneous admission of expert testimony could not be considered harmless; plaintiff entitled to new trial.
In re Estate of Justus, 243 Ill. App. 3d 737, 612 N.E.2d 89, 183 Ill. Dec. 832 (3d Dist. 1993). M.D. based opinion of defendant's mental condition on interviews with petitioner family members, and stated in deposition that information was of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and was reliable. Trial court did not abuse discretion in disallowing doctor's testimony in response to motion in limine, and finding that opinions were based on incompetent evidence; while it is common for family members to be source of information, it would be better to consult as many as possible and here doctor had information only from petitioners who had obvious interest in outcome of proceedings.
In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 180 Ill. Dec. 240, 607 N.E.2d 134 (1992). Involuntary admittee's acquittal of murder did not collaterally estop State from introducing evidence of murder at civil commitment hearing; not required that trial court find by any standard of proof that murder occurred in order to find admitted in need of involuntary admission; inculpatory statements regarding murder admissible at involuntary admission hearing despite suppression at UST discharge ("innocent only") hearing.
In re Thompson, 215 Ill. App. 3d 986, 575 N.E.2d 975, 159 Ill. Dec. 168 (3rd Dist. 1991). Because the State's only witness was a physician, not a psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist as required by Section 3-807, the trial court's order for involuntary admission was reversed.
City of Chicago v. Anthony, 136 Ill. 2d 169, 554 N.E.2d 1381, 144 Ill. Dec. 93 (1990). If another rule of law applicable to the case excludes the information sought to be relied upon by the expert, the information may not be permitted to come before the jury in the guise of basis for expert opinion. Court must exercise discretion in ensuring that underlying facts or data upon which expert opinion is based are of a type reasonably relied upon and meet minimum standards of reliability as condition of admissibility.
In re Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d 413, 554 N.E.2d 494, 143 Ill. Dec. 559 (4th Dist. 1990). While there may be no constitutional right to cross-examination of witnesses in mental health hearings as in criminal cases, cross-examination is generally a matter of right in all cases.
United States v. Lundy, 809 F. 2d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1987). "District courts must ensure that expert opinion testimony is in fact expert opinion, not merely opinion given by an expert."
In re Murphy, 157 Ill. App. 3d 115, 109 Ill. Dec. 311, 509 N.E.2d 1323 (1st Dist. 1987). Trial court erred by allowing doctor to testify about statements made by defendant's mother to social worker.
People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 101 Ill. Dec. 597 (1986). Permissible for testifying expert to rely upon prior psychological evaluations, staff reports, and other medical records from a hospital where respondent has received treatment in making his diagnosis. This testimony will not be considered hearsay since this is the type of information that is reasonably and customarily relied upon in the field of psychiatry.
In re Pritchett, 148 Ill. App. 3d 746, 499 N.E.2d 1029, 102 Ill. Dec. 249 (4th Dist. 1986). Failure of examining physician to give 3-208 warnings bars his subsequent testimony only if respondent's statements were used to form diagnosis.
In re Collins, 102 Ill. App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill. Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Failure of examiner to personally give 3-208 statement of rights, with particularity, bars testimony of examiner at hearing. Although the Appellate Court questions the efficacy of this rule (and notes the contradiction in allowing the respondent to remain silent during the examination while also allowing the respondent to be called as an adverse witness at the trial), the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary admission.
In re Powell, 85 Ill. App. 3d 877, 407 N.E.2d 658, 41 Ill. Dec. 160 (1st Dist. 1980). Respondent waived any self-incrimination argument as to being called as adverse witness where trial counsel objected only on basis of statutory rights, and Mental Health Code does not prohibit such testimony.
In re James, 67 Ill. App. 3d 49, 384 N.E.2d 573, 23 Ill. Dec. 779 (3rd Dist. 1978). Because the State's only expert witness had not personally examined the respondent, his testimony should have been excluded. As a result, the trial court's order for commitment was reversed.
In re Nolan, 66 Ill. App. 3d 744, 384 N.E.2d 134, 23 Ill. Dec. 498 (1st Dist. 1978). After the respondent was called as an adverse witness in his civil commitment hearing, he appealed and complained that this procedure denied him his constitutional rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel. Stating only that the respondent's constitutional arguments blurred the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings, the Appellate Court rejected them. The Court also rejected the argument the Mental Health Code conflicted with, and should therefore supersede, Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act. Thus, the trial court's order for commitment was affirmed.
Kubisz v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App 3d 381, 329 N.E.2d 815 (4th Dist. 1975). Trial judge not authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure to call own witnesses in civil case.
People ex rel. Keith, 38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967). Because the respondent's testimony at his civil commitment trial did not incriminate him, the State's calling him as an adverse witness did not violate his 5th Amendment Right against self-incrimination.
F. Independent Examination
In re Margaret S. , 347 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 808 N.E.2d 1022, 283 Ill. Dec. 734 (1st Dist. 2004). In a hearing for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, respondent is entitled to an independent medical examination. 405 ILCS 5/3-80 4. Statutes provided for extension for completing such examinations. The importance of an independent examination, prior to involuntary medication, when the severe side affects increase in proportion to a patient’s age were manifest because the respondent was 95 years old.
In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 820 N.E.2d 424, 289 Ill. Dec. 648 (2004). When forced medication with psychotropic drugs is sought pursuant to 405 ILCS 5/2-10 7.1(a)(4), medical expertise is required of the independent examiner if the independent examination is to have any meaningful impact upon the decision making process. An unlicensed intern with only a master's degree in psychology was not qualified and therefore constituted a due process violation. The statute uses the terms “medical expert” and “physician” interchangeably.
In re R.W., 332 Ill. App. 3d 901, 266 Ill. Dec. 762, 775 N.E.2d 602 (5th Dist. 2002). The trial court denied the respondent's request for the appointment of an independent examiner, and the respondent appealed. The Appellate Court noted that the case had been on the trial court's docket, and continued, for several weeks, before the respondent finally requested an independent exam on the day the case was scheduled for trial by jury. Treating the request for an exam as a request for a continuance, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court's denial of the request was not an abuse of discretion.
In re R.C. , 338 Ill. App. 3d 103, 788 N.E.2d 99, 272 Ill. Dec. 795 (1st Dist. 2003). Respondent statutorily entitled to an independent examination in an involuntary treatment action and trial court lacked discretion to deny the request even where respondent may have used his request as a delay tactic. Explained In re Pates, 99 Ill. App. 3d 426 N.E.2d 275, 55 Ill. Dec. 300 (5th Dist. 1981) and In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234, 616 N.E.2d 714, 186 Ill. Dec. 524 (5th Dist. 1993) as holding that the statutory entitlement to an independent examination can be satisfied by a department employee if that employee is impartial.
In re Yoder, 289 Ill. App. 3d 465, 682 N.E.2d 753, 225 Ill. Dec. 9 (5th Dist. 1997). The trial court erred, and its order denying the recipient's petition for discharge was reversed, because the trial court improperly denied the recipient’s requests for an independent examination and for a jury trial because the Code provisions governing these rights, Sections 3-802 and 3-804, both apply with equal force in hearings on petitions for admission and hearings on petitions for discharge.
In re Branning, 285 Ill. App. 3d 405, 674 N.E.2d 463, 220 Ill. Dec. 920 (4th Dist. 1997). The Appellate Court ruled that Section 2-110 is unconstitutional because, in violation of the guarantee of procedural due process, that section allowed the trial court to authorize the involuntary administration of ECT without requiring a hearing for which the respondent had the right to consult an independent examiner. [ECT is now governed by Section 2-107.1.]
In re Katz, 267 Ill. App. 3d 692, 642 N.E.2d 893, 205 Ill. Dec. 28 (3rd Dist. 1994). Section 3-804 applies to discharge proceedings per reading of 3-901(b) and In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234 (5th Dist. 1993); thus, recipient entitled to an independent examination.
In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234, 616 N.E.2d 714, 186 Ill. Dec. 524 (5th Dist. 1993). Section 3-804 of the Code does not require appointment of examiner not in employ of DMHDD; thus denial of request for independent evaluation is not error where testifying DMHDD witness appeared to be impartial. Brelje v. Pates, 99 Ill. App. 3d 847 (5th Dist. 1981) followed, In re Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232 (3d Dist. 1985) rejected. Independent examiner as a component of effective assistance of counsel is not a requirement under Illinois law.
In re Rotuno, 156 Ill. App. 3d 989, 510 N.E.2d 463, 109 Ill. Dec. 595 (5th Dist. 1987). Respondent's request for an independent examination, made one day before the hearing, should have been granted and the case should have been continued. Because the respondent was already confined, the State would have suffered no prejudice from the delay. As a result, the trial court's order for involuntary admission was reversed.
In re Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 708, 489 N.E.2d 347, 95 Ill. Dec. 126 (3d Dist. 1986). Denial of right to independent examination violates Section 3-804 and requires reversal, not remand.
In re Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232, 478 N.E.2d 867, 88 Ill. Dec. 376 (3d Dist. 1985). Respondent entitled to independent examination paid for by State. Denial of request for independent exam violated Section 3-804 and required reversal.
Brelje v. Pates, 99 Ill. App. 3d 847, 426 N.E.2d 275, 55 Ill. Dec. 300 (5th Dist. 1981). In petition for discharge hearing, recipient must allege that expert is partial and somehow involved in initial admission, helped prepare treatment plan, or is a full-time employee of DMHDD; only required that expert be impartial, thus 3-804 does not exclude examination by state-employed expert. Unfair for counties where facilities located to bear cost of independent examinations for patients who request discharge. (Psychiatrist's execution of certificate could be raised as a factor in determining that psychiatrist was not "impartial".)
In re Estate of Liebling, 118 Ill. App .2d 460, 254 N.E.2d 531 (2d Dist. 1970). While the court should not become a partisan, the discretion to order an independent examination under S.Ct.R. 215 is broad and to be exercised as the needs of justice require, particularly where, as here, the matter is before the court without a jury, a good deal of time passed during the pendency of the proceedings, and the evidence was in conflict.
G. Continuance
In re Margaret S. , 347 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 808 N.E.2d 1022, 283 Ill. Dec. 734 (1st Dist. 2004). Trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of the hearing for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to allow time for the independent examination to be completed. The denial prejudiced respondent because this left respondent with little possibility of countering psychiatrist's testimony with respondent's own expert.
In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec. 395 (4th Dist. 2003) Trial court abused its discretion by denying respondent’s motion for a two day continuance so that she could obtain affidavits to support her claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her since her family lured her into Illinois to subject her to involuntary commitment and the administration of authorized involuntary treatment.
In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 269 Ill. Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002). The court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a petition for authorized involuntary treatment within the prescribed period set forth in 2-107.1.
H. In General
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that in proceedings to extend involuntary admissions, a hearing is to be conducted. 405 ILCS 5/3-807.
In re Tammy D. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 419, 790 N.E.2d 410, 274 Ill. Dec. 34 (5th Dist. 2003). As a matter of law and public policy a respondent in a mental health proceeding has the right to settle his or her case by agreeing to an order for outpatient treatment. The agreement was neither void as coercive or because it was the result of a grossly disparate bargaining position between the parties, nor against public policy.
In re Robert R., 338 Ill. App 3d 343, 788 N.E.2d 122, 272 Ill. Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 2003). Proceedings for involuntary commitment involves two hearings (1) to determine if the respondent is subject to involuntary admission, and (2) to determine how and where the respondent will be treated.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Involuntary commitment hearings conducted pursuant to the Code are civil matters subject to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The constitutional rights provided to defendants in criminal proceedings do not adhere to respondents in a commitment hearing. However, because of the liberty interest involved, the supreme court has held that procedural due process does guarantee certain protections to civil commitment respondents. The Code provides that every respondent alleged to be subject to involuntary admission shall be represented by counsel.
In re Joseph S. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 599, 791 N.E.2d 80, 274 Ill. Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 2003). Records made with a view towards possible litigation do not qualify as business records since they are not made in the ordinary course of business, but documents routinely prepared under a statutory duty, such as a social work assessment, are not rendered inadmissible because they are used in adversarial proceedings.
In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792 N.E.2d 350, 275 Ill. Dec. 119 (5th Dist. 2003). Mental health hearings must not be conducted pro forma.
In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d 476, 746 N.E.2d 769, 254 Ill. Dec. 1012 (2nd Dist. 2001). Pro se respondents have a constitutional right to cross examine the State's witnesses. Because the respondent in this case was denied that right, the trial court's order for involuntary admission was reversed.
In re Maher, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 734 N.E.2d 95, 248 Ill. Dec. 387 (4th Dist. 2000). At the trial, after closing arguments by counsel, the trial court judge conferred with the respondent's father, in private, then recalled the father to the stand and questioned him. Following this additional testimony, the judge ordered the respondent's involuntary admission. On appeal, finding that the respondent had not objected at the trial and finding no prejudice to the respondent's case, the Appellate Court affirmed.
In re Michael D., 306 Ill. App. 3d 25, 713 N.E.2d 724, 239 Ill. Dec. 193 (1st Dist. 1999). The Appellate Court reversed the order for admission due to three procedural errors. First, although the trial court purported to grant the respondent’s motion for a closed hearing, the court refused to exclude two of the State’s occurrence witnesses from the courtroom. The Appellate Court ruled that Section 3-800 required excluding these witnesses and reversed, without requiring a showing of prejudice. Second, the trial court denied the respondent’s counsel the opportunity to use notes from the respondent’s hospital chart during her cross-examination of the State’s psychiatrist, even though the expert had relied on the chart in forming her opinion. And third, the trial court denied the respondent’s counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s social worker regarding alternatives to hospitalization. These limits on counsel prejudiced the respondent and required reversal.
In re Branning, 285 Ill. App. 3d 405, 674 N.E.2d 463, 220 Ill. Dec. 920 (4th Dist. 1997). In an appeal from the trial court's order for involuntary ECT, the Appellate Court invalidated Section 2-110 because (1) in violation of the guarantee of substantive due process, the statute allowed the involuntary administration of ECT without requiring proof that the respondent lacked decisional capacity, and (2) in violation of procedural due process, the statute did not require a hearing at which the respondent had a right to be present, call and cross examine witnesses, and consult an independent examiner and at which the petitioner had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent lacked decisional capacity and that ECT was in the respondent's best interest and the least restrictive alternative. [The involuntary administration of ECT is now governed by Section 2-107.1.]
In re Williford, 271 Ill. App. 3d 922, 649 N.E.2d 941, 208 Ill. Dec. 581 (5th Dist. 1995). Trial court abused discretion in refusing discovery request made by respondent. Although reviewing court assumed that civil discovery rules do not apply to 2-107. 1 hearings, nothing in Code prohibits discovery; unless expressly forbidden trial court has inherent authority to order reasonable discovery request, which should not be denied without just cause. Here no argument made that request was burdensome, etc. Arguments that access to medical records sufficient reason to deny request and that request directed to petitioner/psychiatrist was improper as not directed to party rejected.
In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311, 583 N.E.2d 555, 164 Ill. Dec. 639 (1991). Petition for change of venue for judicial prejudice where timely filed and in proper form must be granted and any order entered after its presentation is a nullity, even where request routinely made in every case. Ch. 110, par. 2-1001 (a) (2).
In re R.C., 175 Ill. App. 3d 163, 529 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1988). The minor respondent's parents, and the hospital where the minor was admitted, were parties to the minor's mental health hearing and, thus, were entitled to be represented by their own counsel.
In re Williams, 133 Ill. App. 3d 232, 478 N.E.2d 867, 88 Ill. Dec. 376 (3rd Dist. 1985). The Appellate Court found no abuse of discretion when the Kankakee County circuit court denied the respondent's request for a change of venue to Cook County , where the respondent had lived prior to being hospitalized, because the respondent did not plan to call any witnesses from Cook County and was an inpatient in a mental health facility in Kankakee County .
In re Muro, 81 Ill. App. 21, 400 N.E.2d 1042, 36 Ill. Dec. 462 (4th Dist. 1980). According to the version of Section 3-800 then in effect, which provided that the respondent "may have the proceedings transferred to the county of his residence," the trial court had no discretion to deny the respondent's timely, oral motion for change of venue. [Section 3-800 has since been changed to provide merely that the respondent "may request to have the proceedings transferred to the county of his residence."]
In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 10 Ill. Dec. 507 (1977); In re Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d 413, 554 N.E.2d 494, 143 Ill. Dec. 559 (4th Dist. 1990). Mental health proceedings to involuntarily commit conducted pursuant to the MHDD Code are subject to the Code of Civil Procedure.
People v. Galan, 151 Ill. App. 3d 481, 502 N.E.2d 853, 104 Ill. Dec. 356 (2d Dist. 1986). Court should act as advocate for neither state nor defendant, but should act to seek out evidence when it will aid in reaching a just and correct determination.
In re Gardner, 121 Ill. App. 3d 7, 459 N.E.2d 17, 76 Ill. Dec. 608 (4th Dist. 1984). The only methods and procedures by which one may be admitted to a mental health facility are those specified in the MHDD Code.
In re R.S., 117 Ill. App. 3d 698, 453 N.E.2d 139, 72 Ill. Dec. 834 (3d Dist. 1983), aff'd other grounds, 104 Ill. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984). Trial judge is precluded from taking on the role of an advocate for one of the parties.
In re Meyer, 107 Ill. App. 3d 871, 438 N.E.2d 639, 63 Ill. Dec. 708 (2d Dist. 1982). GAC cannot be assessed the costs of proceedings.
People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill. 2d 92, 136 N.E.2d 817 (1956). The role of a trial judge is that of a fair and impartial arbiter.