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I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
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Mental Health Decisions
I. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION:
A(1).Petition/Certificates: Timeliness
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. Appd 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). State's first petition seeking a finding that a patient was a person subject to involuntary commitment was dismissed. Immediately a second petition was filed but the first of two certificates in support of the second petition was not filed until one hour and 20 minutes after the patient was served with the second petition. The patient's detention during the one hour and 20 minute time frame was unlawful and the circuit court's commitment order was erroneous. 405 ILCS 5/3-602, “The petition shall be accompanied by a certificate.”
In In re Helen S., 342 Ill. Appd 330, 795 N.E.2d 298, 276 Ill. Dec.945 (5th Dist. 2003). Three separate petitions dismissed as untimely. To calculate timeliness of State's petition to involuntarily admit patient to facility under statute requiring petition to be filed within 24 hours of patient's admission to facility, correct date is the date the patient was initially confined in hospital, rather than date trial court approved temporary detention of patient under different statute. Petition was untimely when filed within 24 hours of temporary detention order but more than a week after patient's initial admission. Patient was never discharged, but rather remained admitted through date the petition was filed. Requires dismissal of petition.
In re Nancy A., 342 Ill. Appd 355, 795 N.E.2d 377, 277 Ill. Dec. 10 (5th Dist. 2003). Dismissal without prejudice of untimely petition to involuntarily admit respondent to mental health facility did not restart 24-hour period for State to file and serve another petition after patient was admitted to facility. The second petition filed within 24 hours of dismissal of first petition was also untimely, where respondent was not discharged, and did not remain voluntarily after first petition was dismissed. The original admission date applied to the second petition, making it untimely.
Doe v. Channon, 335 Ill. Appd 709, 781 N.E.2d 517, 269 Ill. Dec 720 (1st Dist. 2002). The overnight detention of the patient was lawful as the 24-hour detention period provided for pursuant to the first certificate issued had not yet expired. The plaintiff was admitted on a Friday, examined by a psychiatrist on Saturday, but not released until Sunday. Section 3-610 states that a psychiatrist must examine the respondent no later than 24 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after he is admitted. 405 ILCS 5/3-610
In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Where a petition was drafted but not filed prior to an ex parte hearing for detention and further psychiatric evaluations there was no violation of 405 ILCS 5/3-611. The subsequent written petition was filed within 24 hours of the respondent’s admission in accordance with sections 3-611 and 3-701 of the code.
In re Demir 322 Ill. Appd 989, 751 N.E.2d 616, 256 Ill. Dec. 226 (4th Dist. 2001). Using de novo review, and ruling that "the failure to timely file the petition is an error that cannot be waived … or considered harmless," the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary admission because the petition had not been filed within 24 hours of the respondent's admission.
In re Moore, 301 Ill. Appd 759, 704 N.E.2d 442, 235 Ill. Dec. 93 (4th Dist. 1999). Appealing the order for his involuntary admission, the respondent argued that, in violation of Section 3-610, he had not been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of his admission. The Court reviewed this question of law de novo. The Court found that, for purposes of 3-610, “admission” refers only to the respondent’s presence on a hospital’s psychiatric unit, not to his presence at the emergency room or other areas of the hospital. Because the respondent had been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of his presence on the hospital’s psychiatric unit, there was no violation of Section 3-610.
In re Ellis, 284 Ill. Appd 691, 672 N.E.2d 893, 220 Ill. Dec. 76 (3rd Dist. 1996). In violation of Section 3-610, the State failed to show that the respondent had been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. And, in violation of Section 3-601, the State failed to list the names of the respondent’s family on the petition. Thus, the trial court’s order for involuntary admission was reversed. (LAS)
In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. Appd 956, 667 N.E.2d 720, 217 Ill. Dec. 631 (2nd Dist. 1996). The respondent appealed the order for admission, alleging that he had not been personally examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of his admission and that no second certificate had ever been filed with court. Refusing to engage in speculation, the Appellate Court ruled that the State had not shown that the required examination had occurred and, in any event, the record was clear that no second certificate had been filed. Relying on the plain error rule, and finding the State's violation of the Code "inexcusable," the Court reversed the trial court's order.
In re Tiffin, 269 I11. Appd 285, 646 N.E.2d 285, 206 Ill. Dec. 918 (4th Dist. 1995). Error to allow reinstatement of original petition, voluntarily dismissed with leave to reinstate upon respondent's request for voluntary admission, when respondent ultimately requested discharge. 735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a) is inconsistent with 405 ILCS 5/3-403 & 3-b02; allowing reinstatement would result in stale certificates being filed with petition contrary to Code requirements.
In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. Appd 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill. Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1994). Reviewing court would not engage in "string of unsupported speculations" to reach conclusion that petition for continued involuntary admission was timely filed where timeliness could not be determined by review of record.
In re Connors, 255 Ill. Appd 781, 627 N.E.2d 1171, 194 Ill. Dec. 529 (4th Dist. 1994). Res judicata prohibited filing of 3-600 emergency petition on same day that trial court earlier discharged respondent, having found proof insufficient in initial 3-700 proceeding. Although individual petitioners were different, the State was party to both proceedings; fact that petitions were brought pursuant to different Code sections was insignificant, as both involved involuntary admission; different evidence presented at second hearing could have been presented at first hearing and some change of circumstance is necessary.
In re Stone, 249 Ill. Appd 861, 619 N.E.2d 1345, 189 Ill. Dec. 296 (2d Dist. 1993). Section 3-611 of the Code does not include a "business hours" exception. "If a person is admitted on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the 24-hour period in which the petition must be filed begins at midnight of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, and it expires at midnight the following day...the 24-hour period should be said to begin at 12:01 a.m. of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, and expires at 12:01 a.m. the following day. "
In re LaTouche, 247 Ill. Appd 751, 617 N.E.2d 882, 187 Ill. Dec87 (2d Dist. 1993). The untimely filing of the petition, in violation of Section 3-611, was neither waived nor harmless and required reversal of the trial court's order for admission.
In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134, 180 Ill. Dec. 240 (1992). Untimeliness of filing of petition for recommitment (filed one day after expiration of original commitment order) was waived where not raised in trial court and delay resulted in no prejudice.
In re Long, 233 Ill. Appd 334, 599 N.E.2d 90, 174 Ill. Dec. 544 (2d Dist. 1992). Petition filed after expiration of initial commitment period would be considered a new petition for emergency admission under 3-600, inasmuch as respondent was "discharged" and despite respondent's allegation that she was never actually released. "Discharge" distinguishes this case from Hatala, Walker, Bloyer, and Vancil. Read, Shaw, and Clarke relied upon.
In re Houlihan, 231 Ill. Appd 677, 596 N.E.2d 189, 172 Ill. Dec. 910 (2d Dist. 1992). First petition naming voluntary respondent who had requested release was dismissed for lack of timeliness, and the respondent was discharged; second petition filed immediately in open court. Argument that second petition was untimely per 3-403 rejected; petition was proper under 3-701. Shaw followed, Guthrie rejected. Court noted that in this case, unlike either of those cases, respondent was "discharged."
People v. Read, 822 Ill. Appd 664, 592 N.E.2d 1178, 170 Ill. Dec. 498 (5th Dist. 1992). Actual physical release of respondent pursuant to court's dismissal of petition did not prohibit State from filing subsequent petition, as actual physical release is not necessary to definition of "discharge" and record fails to demonstrate that respondent sought to leave, or was prevented from leaving, facility between dismissal of first petition and filing of second petition.
In re Clark, 220 Ill. Appd 1024, 581 N.E.2d 408, 163 Ill. Dec. 457 (4th Dist. 1991). Failure to have second certificate did not justify release of respondent where third petition, filed day before hearing, included two certificates, and was basis of hearing after dismissal of second insufficiently supported petition, and despite insufficient notice. Note that Clarke was under investigation for solicitation of murder, had made threats, and had earlier been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The Appellate Court was "singularly unimpressed" with the efforts of DMHDD and the State's Attorney to comply with the Code.
In re Valentine, 201 Ill. Appd 10, 558 N.E.2d 807, 146 Ill. Dec. 844 (5th Dist. 1990). Failure to comply with 3-610 requirement of psychiatric examination within twenty-four hours of admission deprives trial court of jurisdiction and renders judgment erroneous and of no effect. Respondent should have been released on counsel's motion. Wheeler distinguished.
In re Hatala, 200 Ill. Appd 163, 558 N.E.2d 694, 146 Ill. Dec. 731 (2d Dist. 1990); In re Walker, 200 Ill. Appd 159, 558 N.E.2d 691, 146 Ill. Dec. 728 (2d Dist. 1990). Failure to file petition for re-commitment before expiration of prior order deprives trial court of jurisdiction. Any part of first day of prior order counted as full day in computing duration of order.
In re Franklin, 186 Ill. Appd 245, 541 N.E.2d 168, 133 Ill. Dec31 (4th Dist. 1989). In proceedings for continued commitment, Art. VII applies and requires that respondent be given notice 36 hours prior to the court-ordered examination required by 3-702; 3-704 requires that the examination be performed within 24 hours after "detention" and the detention date is the date the petition for continued hospitalization is filed. Respondent must be served with a copy of the petition, order for examination and statement of rights
In re Vancil, 183 Ill. Appd 204, 538 N.E.2d 1372, 131 Ill. Dec. 816 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Bloyer, 185 Ill. Appd 245, 541 N.E.2d 224, 133 Ill. Dec87 (2d Dist. 1989). Untimely petition, in violation of Section 3-811, requires mandatory discharge.
In re Riviere, 183 Ill. Appd 456, 539 N.E.2d 451, 132 Ill. Dec. 141 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Johnson, 191 Ill. Appd 93, 546 N.E.2d 1176, 138 Ill. Dec. 121 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Satterlee, 148 Ill. Appd 84, 499 N.E.2d 101, 101 Ill. Dec. 734 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Elkow, 167 Ill. Appd 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Untimely filing of a petition, in violation of Section 3-611, requires reversal.
In re R.C., 175 Ill. Appd 163, 529 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 1988). Although Section 3-503 requires a minor to be examined prior to admission, according to the Appellate Court, this section does not require examination prior to the minor's arrival at the hospital. Instead, if the minor is examined within a reasonable time after arriving at the hospital, Section 3-503 has been followed.
In re Shirley, 154 Ill. Appd 850, 507 N.E.2d 503, 107 Ill. Dec. 590 (4th Dist. 1987). No requirement that second petition, filed after voluntary dismissal of original petition, be filed within twenty-four hours after admission because second petition was brought under Art. VII, not Art. VI and 3-611 was not applicable. Mental Health Code does not prohibit voluntary dismissal of petition and refiling of new petition where bona fide effort made to procure hearing on original petition and when that failed, new petition was immediately filed. (Record silent as to whether respondent had been discharged upon dismissal of original petition.)
In re Smith, 145 Ill. Appd 1002, 496 N.E.2d 497, 99 Ill. Dec. 804 (4th Dist. 1986). Untimely 3-813 petition requires reversal; respondent entitled to discharge despite intervening petition.
In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. Appd 836, 493 N.E.2d 662, 97 Ill. Dec. 855 (4th Dist. 1986). The petition for involuntary admission was filed more than 5 business days after the respondent's written request for discharge in violation of Section 3-403. Even though trial counsel had made no objection, because the statutory violation was readily apparent on the face of the record, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for admission.
A(2). Petition/Certificates: Form
In re Denise C., 348 Ill. Appd 889, 810 N.E.2d 654, 284 Ill. Dec. 864 (1st Dist. 2004). A petition that fails to list relatives or friends or to indicate that a diligent inquiry was made to locate them is fatally defective. 405 ILCS 5/30601(b)(2). Commitment order not reversed where respondent refused to give information, evidence showed a diligent effort was made to find respondent’s relatives and friends, and there was no prejudice to the respondent.
In re Robert D., 345 Ill. Appd 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). State failed to indicate name and address of substitute decision maker or to state that diligent inquiry had been taken to determine if one existed in a petition for involuntary admission. The error was considered harmless because the respondent at trial or on appeal did not allege that he had executed a declaration of mental health treatment or that a substitute decision maker existed.
In re Joseph S., 339 Ill. Appd 599, 791 N.E.2d 80, 274 Ill. Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 2003). While it is reversible error when petition alleges one basis for involuntary admission and State only proves up the other basis (In re Moore, 292 Ill. Appd 1069, 226 Ill. Dec. 858, 686 N.E.2d 641 (1st Dist. 1997), here the petition alleged inability to provide for basic physical needs, the State proved that element, and the court made a specific finding of inability to provide.
Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 153 Ill. Dec. 1365 (1991),Towne v. Town of Libertyville, 190 Ill. Appd 563, 546 N.E.2d 810, 137 Ill. Dec. 865 (2nd Dist. 1989). When determining whether a petition states a cause of action, the court must take all well-pleaded facts in the challenged petition as true; however, conclusions of law will not be taken as true, unless supported by specific factual allegations that form the basis of such conclusions. Thus, if, after deleting the conclusions that are pleaded, there are not sufficient allegations of fact to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be granted regardless of whether it informs the defendant in a general way of the nature of the claim against him.
In re Demir, 322 Ill. Appd 989, 751 N.E.2d 616, 256 Ill. Dec. 226 (4th Dist. 2001). Police deputies took the respondent to a mental health facility, but, once there, the facility social worker, not the police, filled out the petition for admission. Using de novo review, the Appellate Court ruled that, when "the officer believes a person is in need of involuntary commitment [and transports the person to a mental health facility], the officer must then fill out the petition as required by section 3-606." Having denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, and having granted the petition for involuntary admission, the trial court erred, and its order was reversed.
In re George O., 314 Ill. Appd 1045, 734 N.E.2d 13, 248 Ill. Dec05 (3rd Dist. 2000). The Appellate Court reviewed de novo the respondent's allegations of statutory noncompliance and reversed the trial court's order for involuntary admission because the first certificate did not contain all of the allegations required by Section 3-602, the first certificate was not timely filed, and the second certificate was not clearly shown to have been executed by a psychiatrist as required by Section 3-610.
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. Appd 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). According to the Appellate Court in its review of this civil commitment case, the State is statutorily required to provide, in the petition, the names of witnesses who could testify to the events alleged in the petition. But, if the trial court allows a witness to testify, even though he was not named in the petition, the court does not abuse its discretion "where the identity of such witnesses is disclosed elsewhere on the face of the petition" or where the identity of such witnesses could be ascertained by counsel's "due diligence" and no undue prejudice is shown. Here, even though the petition referred only to an unnamed "caseworker," that caseworker was allowed to testify at the hearing, and the trial court's order for admission was affirmed on appeal.
In re Robinson, 287 Ill. Appd 1088, 679 N.E.2d 818, 223 Ill. Dec67 (4th Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case, the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that procedural irregularities had been waived and were harmless: (1) although the petition for admission did not list the names of relatives, an attachment to the petition listed the name of a sister, and (2) although the return of service portion of the petition was not signed, a progress note admitted into evidence proved that the respondent did receive a copy of the petition.
In re Ellis, 284 Ill. Appd 691, 672 N.E.2d 893, 220 Ill. Dec. 76 (3rd Dist. 1996). In violation of Section 3-610, the State failed to show that the respondent had been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. And, in violation of Section 3-601, the State failed to list the names of the respondent’s family on the petition. Thus, the trial court’s order for involuntary admission was reversed.
In re Weissing (4th Dist. 1992), 229 Ill. Appd 737, 593 N.E.2d 1137, 171 Ill. Dec17; In re Adams (4th Dist. 1993), 239 Ill. Appd 880, 607 N.E.2d 681, 180 Ill. Dec. 612. Petition fatally defective where no indication of names and addresses of relatives and friends or diligent effort to locate them. Error recognized despite lack of objection at trial and respondent's attempt to voluntarily admit himself. Nau distinguished; where outcome of the hearing "may have been prejudiced by State's failure to strictly comply with the Code, reversal…is proper. The error...may have been prejudicial.."
In re Hilton, 189 Ill. Appd 821, 545 N.E.2d 757, 137 Ill. Dec. 104 (3d Dist. 1989). Certificate signed by a doctor as a physician, rather than a psychiatrist, does not violate 3-703 where there is a lack of any evidence that the physician did not meet the statutory qualifications for a psychiatrist. Physician testified at the hearing and there was a general stipulation to her qualifications. Distinguishes In re Stone, 178 Ill. Appd 1084, 534 N.E.2d 213 (3d Dist. 1989), where no stipulation to same physician's qualifications, and reversal was the result of her signature as "physician" on second certificate.
In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. Appd 364, 544 N.E.2d 409, 135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist. 1989). Certified social worker is clinical social worker for purpose of Section 1-122, and any objections to qualifications were waived by failure to object at hearing.
In re Franklin, 186 Ill. Appd 245, 541 N.E.2d 168, 133 Ill. Dec31 (4th Dist. 1989). Errors visible on face of the record are not waivable and are reviewable under a doctrine analogous to plain error.
Record fails to reflect court order for examination (3-702), 36 hours notice of such examination (3-705) or delivery to respondent of copy of petition, order for examination, and statement of rights (3-705). Record demonstrates notice served on same DMHDD employee who signed petition; 3-705 does not allow substitute service. Failure to provide timely examination-704.
In re Elkow<, 167 Ill. Appd 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Petition must specify MHDD Code section under which it is brought.
In re Hightshoe, 155 Ill. Appd 371, 508 N.E.2d 488, 108 Ill. Dec27 (4th Dist. 1987). First certificate, executed in Indiana by Indiana physician, included an illegible signature. Issue of physician's, and thus certificate's, compliance with Illinois requirements waived where not raised at trial. The court considered the question of the physician's licensure to practice in Illinois to require speculation, and thus validity of the certificate was not suitable for review as analogous to plain error because the error was not readily apparent from the record.
In re Wheeler, 152 Ill. Appd 371, 504 N.E.2d 524, 105 Ill. Dec. 424 (2d Dist. 1987). Technical deficiencies in certificate (not based entirely on personal observation although personal exam made) did not affect trial court's power to order involuntary admission where no challenge made to sufficiency of evidence.
In re Pritchett, 148 Ill. Appd 746, 499 N.E.2d 1029, 102 Ill. Dec. 249 (4th Dist. 1986). Failure of examining physician to give 3-208 warnings bars subsequent testimony by examiner only if respondent's statements used to form diagnosis.
In re Collins, 102 Ill. Appd 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill. Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Certificates are not substantive evidence and cannot be basis for involuntary hospitalization. Failure of examiner to personally give 3-208 statement of rights, with particularity, bars testimony of examiner at hearing.
In re Porter, 98 Ill. Appd 869, 424 N.E.2d 952, 54 Ill. Dec. 202 (3d Dist. 1981). Where two examiners are present with respondent and first examiner gives respondent his rights but second examiner does not, rights sufficiently accorded if two interviews occurred in immediate succession. Respondent's waiver his right to remain silent given where he stated he understood his rights and did not want to talk anymore, but then stated he wanted to talk and exam proceeded. Distinguishes Rizer, 87 Ill. Appd 795, 409 N.E.2d 383 (1st Dist. 1980) where second exam came two days after first.
In re Evans, 86 Ill. Appd 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill. Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Certificates serve to establish probable cause for emergency admission, but are not evidence and cannot be used to support involuntary admission order.
In re Wilson, 41 Ill. Appd 522, 353 N.E.2d 681 (1st Dist. 1976). According to the Appellate Court, although "vague," the petition for emergency admission, which described the respondent as "violent, destructive, uncontrollable and bizarre," provided adequate reasons for admission and adequate notice to the respondent of the issues to be raised at the commitment hearing. Finding no error, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's order for admission.
People v. Ralls, 23 Ill. Appd 96, 318 N.E.2d 703 (5th Dist. 1974). Failure to provide specific reasons why respondent is in need of mental treatment in certificate renders emergency hospitalization improper.
In re Gerich, 22 Ill. Appd 575, 317 N.E.2d 724 (1st Dist. 1974). The petition for respondent's admission referred to the attached certificate as the source of factual allegations supporting the need for respondent's hospitalization and as the source of witnesses with knowledge of those allegations. The certificate alleged that respondent was confused, disoriented, without financial means, and unable to care for himself. Reading the two documents together, the Appellate Court found that the petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Mental Health Code, and the Court affirmed the trial court's order for involuntary admission.
People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. Appd 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1974). It is statutorily incumbent upon State to provide information as to names of witnesses who may prove facts alleged in petition.
A(3). Petition/Certificates: Service of petition/notice
In re Jill R., 336 Ill. Appd 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec95 (4th Dist. 2003) Despite the compelling need for strict compliance with involuntary commitment statutes, where the respondent did not challenge the lack of notice at the hearing, where the purpose behind the notice requirement has been fulfilled, and where respondent was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, failure to serve respondent with notice of hearing is harmless error.
In re Robinson, 287 Ill. Appd 1088, 679 N.E.2d 818, 223 Ill. Dec67 (4th Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case, the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that procedural irregularities had been waived and were harmless: (1) although the petition for admission did not list the names of relatives, an attachment to the petition listed the name of a sister, and (2) although the return of service portion of the petition was not signed, a progress note admitted into evidence proved that the respondent did receive a copy of the petition.
In re Martens, 269 Ill. Appd 324, 646 N.E.2d 27, 206 Ill. Dec. 895 (2nd Dist. 1995). Although the absence of the required notice to the respondent's guardian did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, the error did require the reversal of the trial court's order for involuntary admission. The State failed to meet its burden of showing that notice had been given, and the absence of notice was not harmless because whether the respondent was able to meet his basic physical needs was related to the duties of his guardian.
In re Luker, 255 111. Appd 367, 627 N.E.2d 1166, 194 Ill. Dec. 524 (4th Dist. 1993). Lack of proof of service of petition on respondent, and (either) untimely filing of petition or untimely psychiatric exam all waived. Dissent: errors are apparent on the face of the record and not harmless.
In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134, 180 Ill. Dec. 240 (1992). Because he had been served with notice of hearing prior to the filing of the petition for admission, the respondent alleged that he had not been served with notice at the direction of the court as required by the Mental Health Code. The Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's order for admission, however, because the respondent and his attorney had received actual notice, had made no objection and had explicitly agreed at trial that there was no issue as to service, and had not alleged any prejudice on appeal. In so doing, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled, to the extent inconsistent with its decision in this case, King, Long, and Price.
In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883, 157 Ill. Dec. 419 (1991). The Appellate Court had held that, where the notice form failed to demonstrate service on respondent, the trial court's order for admission must be reversed. The Supreme Court agreed that involuntary admission proceedings implicate serious liberty interests, but declined to enforce reversal for the record's failure to reflect affirmative proof of formal notice when both the respondent and counsel received actual notice, respondent's trial counsel made no objection and made no request for a continuance, and prejudice was neither alleged nor evident.
In re Devine, 214 Ill. Appd 1, 572 N.E.2d 1238, 157 Ill. Dec. 774 (2nd Dist. 1991). Absence of notarization on proof of service did not affect the validity of service. Both the respondent and counsel appeared at the hearing, neither objected, and there was no claim of prejudice. Thus, the trial court's order was affirmed.
In re Lamb, 202 Ill. Appd 725, 560 N.E.2d 422, 148 Ill. Dec. 120 (2nd Dist. 1990). Trial court, not state agency, must set hearing date, and notice must be served under court's direction as required by 3-706. Where notice neither issued nor served under court's direction, respondent not properly served with notice.
In re Riviere, 183 Ill. Appd 456, 539 N.E.2d 451, 132 Ill. Dec. 141 (3d Dist. 1989); In re Elkow, 167 Ill. Appd 187, 521 N.E.2d 290, 118 Ill. Dec. 222 (4th Dist. 1988). Failure to demonstrate proof of service of petition on respondent within twelve hours of admission is plain error.
In re Plank, 169 Ill. Appd 411, 523 N.E.2d 614, 119 Ill. Dec. 858 (4th Dist. 1988); In re Franklin, 186 Ill. Appd 245, 541 N.E.2d 168, 133 Ill. Dec31 (4th Dist. 1989). Failure of record to reflect proper proof of service of notice of hearing on respondent, as required by Sections 3-611 and 3-706, is reversible error.
In re King, 148 Ill. Appd 741, 499 N.E.2d 1032, 102 Ill. Dec. 252 (4th Dist. 1986); In re Price, 152 Ill. Appd 960, 505 N.E.2d 37, 105 Ill. Dec. 911 (4th Dist. 1987). Notice served prior to filing of petition is improper service of notice; return portion also incomplete. [Both cases overruled in In re Nau.]
Snavely v. Snavely, 349 Ill. App69, 110 N.E.2d 685 (1st Dist. 1953). Where notice was not served on respondent until day of hearing, order for involuntary commitment was void for want of jurisdiction.
Eddy v. People, 15 Ill. 386 (1854). Notice to alleged "lunatic" necessary as a general principle of law, and should affirmatively appear of record.
Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 Ill. 591 (1891). Statutory requirement that notice "shall" issue and be served upon respondent is mandatory; finding entered without proof of such notice properly excluded in later proceeding, inasmuch as it was void for want of jurisdiction.
A(4). Petition/Certificates: Voluntary recipients
In re N.S., No. 4-04-0942 (4th Dist. Sept. 7, 2005), 2005 WL 2821816, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1065. Proceedings for involuntary admission cannot proceed on a voluntarily admitted patient unless the patient has filed a written request for discharge and has not rescinded that request in writing within five days. 405 ILCS 5/3-403. A checkmark in the petition for involuntary admission that a written request for discharge was made is not evidence.
In re N.S., No. 4-04-0942 (4th Dist. Sept. 7, 2005), 2005 WL 2821816, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1065.; The Code affords greater rights to voluntarily admitted patients than to those involuntarily admitted.; This reflects a legislative intent to encourage voluntary admissions.; This policy is based on psychiatric evidence indicating a patient is more likely to be rehabilitated when undertaking treatment voluntarily than when therapy is forced upon him.
In re James E. , 207 Ill. 2d 105, 797 N.E.2d 622, 278 Ill. Dec. 27 (2003). If it can no longer adequately treat a patient voluntarily admitted under 3-403, a private hospital may file a petition for involuntary admission against a patient who has not requested his discharge in writing because, unlike a state hospital, it lacks the legal means to transfer the patient to a different facility to ensure he receives appropriate treatment. This scenario is a narrow exception to the rule espoused in In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984), which is expressly preserved, that a written request for discharge must precede the institution of involuntary commitment proceedings against a voluntarily admitted patient. James E. reaffirmed the holding in Hays that one of the purposes of the Mental Health Code is to encourage voluntary admissions and that patients who voluntarily undertake treatment are more likely to be rehabilitated. Hays was expressly not overruled.
Wilson v. Formigoni (N.D. Ill. 1993), 832 F. Supp. 1152. Discussion of the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy with respect to recipient rights. Actual circumstances of confinement must be analyzed rather than placing reliance on technical label of status. Lack of viable alternative may result in essential involuntary commitment despite voluntary status. In this damage action for injuries after escape, some evidence of affirmative action in form of coercion on part of state to retain Wilson in custody; voluntary status-allegedly not entirely knowing.
In re Bennett, 251 Ill. Appd 887, 623 N.E.2d 942, 191 Ill. Dec52 (4th Dist. 1992). Uncontroverted testimony that patient had been voluntary and had submitted written request for discharge constituted sufficient evidence that he had done so. Weimer, Splett and Macedo merely hold involuntary admission improper where record indicates no evidence of written request. Also, the trial court did not err in rejecting patient's renewed request to be voluntarily admitted because the patient did not recognize his need for treatment and had a "history of abusing the voluntary admission process."
In re Lawrence, 239 Ill. Appd 424, 607 N.E.2d 659, 180 Ill. Dec. 590 (2d Dist. 1992). Failure to reaffirm desire to continue treatment under Section 3-404 is not the equivalent of 3-403 notice of desire to be discharged so as to allow State to institute involuntary admission proceedings. While in some instances failure to reaffirm might be properly recorded in such a way as to satisfy the "written notice" requirement of 3-403, record must reflect submission of effective request for discharge; this record contains no such evidence because the notation on the petition is not evidence.
In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883, 157 Ill. Dec. 419 (1991). While not adopting the reasoning of the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the Appellate Court’s reversal of the trial court’s order because the record failed to reflect that Splett, a voluntary recipient, had submitted a written discharge request prior to a petition having been filed, citing In re Hays.
In re Weimer, 219 Ill. Appd 1005, 580 N.E.2d 182, 162 Ill. Dec. 556 (2nd Dist. 1991). Petition asserted voluntary patient had submitted written notice of desire to be discharged, but petition and certificates serve "only as a showing of probable cause to initiate the hearing...and [are] not evidence." Waiver inapplicable per Hays. State's attempt to supplement the record on appeal with evidence of written request rejected. Section 3-403 must be strictly adhered to under Splett; the written request for discharge must be part of the record at the time of the hearing.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). Person who is willing to sign voluntary admission forms but is incapable of making informed decision is unlikely to benefit from voluntary patient's statutory right to seek discharge. He is thus in danger of indefinite confinement without the benefit of procedural safeguards of the involuntary admission process, which might include non-confined (outpatient) treatment.
In re Guthrie, 196 Ill. Appd 352, 553 N.E.2d 735, 143 Ill. Dec. 28 (3d Dist. 1990). Affirmative showing that five-day filing requirement was not met is reversible error. Unlike Macedo, in this case, the record demonstrates no written request for discharge, but one of the certificates referred to its execution by respondent, the date of its expiration, and failure of respondent to rescind. Mandatory requirement in 3-403 of discharge or timely filing of petition cannot be avoided by referring to other sections of the MHDD Code to justify non-compliance.
In re Stone, 178 Ill. Appd 1084, 534 N.E.2d 213, 128 Ill. Dec. 193 (3d Dist. 1989). Record must reflect new psychiatric examination and certificate where new petition is filed against voluntary patient who has requested discharge.
In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. Appd 364, 544 N.E.2d 409, 135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist. 1989). Failure to attach discharge request to petition waived where petition and certificates referred to discharge request and it was confirmed in respondent's testimony.
In re Price, 152 Ill. Appd 960, 505 N.E.2d 37, 105 Ill. Dec. 911 (4th Dist. 1987). Involuntary admission proceedings against a voluntary patient must be preceded by the patient's written request for discharge.
In re Macedo, 150 Ill. Appd 673, 502 N.E.2d 72, 103 Ill. Dec. 925 (4th Dist. 1986). Written request for discharge must precede involuntary admission proceedings against voluntary patient. Because 16 year old respondent was admitted as a voluntary recipient under 3-502, provisions of Art. IV apply to involuntary hospitalization efforts, not 3-503. Request for discharge must accompany petition; mental health center must maintain a record of the request, as all records.
In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. Appd 836, 493 N.E.2d 662, 97 Ill. Dec. 855 (4th Dist. 1986). Petition filed more than five days after request for discharge by voluntary patient is untimely and requires reversal.
In re Hays, 115 Ill. Appd 686, 451 N.E.2d 9, 71 Ill. Dec. 521 (4th Dist. 1983) aff'd. 102 Ill. 2d 314, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984). Rights accorded voluntary patients in MHDD Code demonstrate legislative intent to encourage voluntary admissions. State could not initiate involuntary admission proceedings against a voluntary patient who had not made a written request for discharge.
In re Rusick, 115 Ill. Appd 108, 450 N.E.2d 418, 70 Ill. Dec. 945 (5th Dist. 1983). No error in denying respondent's request for voluntary admission, where record indicated that he had a recent history of admissions, that he was not always able to assess his need for treatment, that the facility director had not approved his voluntary admission, and that there was testimony that prior voluntary admissions had resulted in premature requests for discharge.
In re Hall, 92 Ill. Appd 1136, 416 N.E.2d 731, 48 Ill. Dec. 458 (4th Dist. 1981). The Appellate Court affirmed the order for respondent's involuntary admission, even though the respondent had wanted to sign an application for voluntary admission, because the respondent did not recognize the need for treatment and his doctor opined that involuntary admission would be more appropriate.
People v. Hill, 72 Ill. Appd 638, 391 N.E.2d 51, 28 Ill. Dec. 852 (1st Dist. 1979); In re Clement, 34 Ill. Appd 574, 340 N.E.2d 217 (1st Dist. 1975); In re Meyer, 107 Ill. Appd 871, 438 N.E.2d 639, 63 Ill. Dec. 708 (2d Dist. 1982). Order entered for involuntary admission of voluntary patient who has not requested discharge is void.
Montague v. George J. London Memorial Hosp., 78 Ill. Appd 298, 396 N.E.2d 1289, 33 Ill. Dec. 565 (1st Dist. 1979). Failure to release voluntary patient or cause petition to be filed within five days of request for discharge gave rise to civil action for damages for violation of statutory procedures.
In re Byrd, 68 Ill. Appd 849, 386 N.E.2d 385, 25 Ill. Dec. 114 (1st Dist. 1979). Evidence must be adduced to demonstrate why voluntary admission would be inadequate and why involuntary admission is necessary in order for court to deny request for voluntary admission.
A(5). Petition/Certificates: In general
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that proceedings to extend involuntary admissions are subject to the same provisions of the Code as those governing initial involuntary admissions. 405 ILCS 5/3-813(b).
Chapala v. Hoffman Estates Police Dep't, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2004). Commitment of a police officer by his superiors to a mental hospital did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers had probable cause to believe that the officer was mentally ill and was a danger to himself or others.
In re Moore, 292 Ill. Appd 1069, 686 N.E.2d 641, 226 Ill. Dec. 858 (1st Dist. 1997). In the petition for involuntary admission, the State alleged that the respondent was likely to inflict serious physical harm, but, at the hearing, the State presented evidence only that the respondent was unable to meet her basic physical needs. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order for admission, applying the general rule applicable in all civil cases that prohibits a party’s recovery after having alleged one cause of action but having proven another.
Olsen v. Karwoski, 68 Ill. Appd 1031, 386 N.E.2d 444, 25 Ill. Dec. 173 (1st Dist. 1979). Emergency admission to a mental hospital is an extreme step and should not be used except in true emergencies.
In re Presswood, 51 Ill. Appd 104, 366 N.E.2d 442, 9 Ill. Dec. 185 (1st Dist. 1977). Involuntary hospitalization is a deprivation of liberty as would be imprisonment.
B(1). Clear and Convincing Evidence: Mental illness
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). For a medical opinion as to the existence of a mental illness to be clear and convincing, it is sufficient if the expert indicates the basis of his diagnosis by having directly observed a respondent on several occasions:
In re Reed, 291 Ill. Appd 1084, 685 N.E.2d 391, 226 Ill. Dec. 288 (3rd Dist. 1997). The petition for admission alleged that the respondent was mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm. At the hearing, however, the doctor testified that the respondent was developmentally disabled but only suggested that the respondent might also have a mental illness. The trial court ordered the respondent’s admission, but the Appellate Court reversed, holding that the State had failed to prove that the respondent was mentally ill.
In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 176 Ill. Dec. 14, 601< N.E.2d 712 (1992). State must show that respondent's mental illness substantially impairs his functioning. "Substantial impairment" means, to justify involuntary treatment, mental illness serious enough to create reasonable expectation that respondent will inflict serious harm upon himself or another in the near future, or that respondent will be unable to provide for his own care and protection.
In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. Appd 364, 544 N.E.2d 409, 135 Ill. Dec. 913 (3d Dist. 1989). Illness must substantially impair respondent's thought process, perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior or ability to cope with life's ordinary demands.
People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 101 Ill. Dec. 597 (1986). Section 1-119 requires not merely finding of mental illness but also that one is reasonably expected to present a serious danger to self or others because of the illness. The mental illness must substantially impair thought, perception of reality, emotional process, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with ordinary demands of life.
In re Marquardt, 100 Ill. Appd 741, 427 N.E.2d 411, 56 Ill. Dec31 (1st Dist. 1981). Where only evidence that substance abuse is a mental illness is reference to it in DSM-III and physician's statement that drug abuse is recognized by psychiatric profession as a mental illness, no clear and convincing evidence of mental illness.
People v. Reliford, 65 Ill. Appd 177, 382 N.E.2d 72 (1st Dist. 1978). Mere status of mental illness or mental retardation without further rationale or inquiry is insufficient to justify involuntary commitment; must be causal connection between illness and dangerousness to comport with due process.
People v. Bradley, 22 Ill. Appd 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1st Dist. 1974). Evidence of mental illness alone is insufficient to support an order for involuntary admission.
B(2). Clear and Convincing Evidence: Harm
In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. Appd 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec61 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). To prove a person is reasonably expected to inflict harm on himself or another, the State must present clear and convincing evidence in the form of explicit medical testimony given by a psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who examined the person. Such testimony is considered clear and convincing if the medical expert bases his or her diagnosis on direct observation of the patient. Proof of actual harm inflicted by the person is not required.
In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. Appd 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec61 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). Trial court's determination that respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon another person was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Psychiatrist gave an explicit opinion as to the danger respondent was likely to pose to others if discharged, and she had a more than adequate factual basis for this opinion, including numerous personal observations of patient's lewd and physically combative behavior toward other patients and staff. A witness corroborated psychiatrist’s assertions through his own testimony that respondent attempted to strike, scratch, and kick staff members.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Generally, the inability to care for oneself so as to guard against physical harm is found when the illness substantially impairs one's thought processes, perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with life's ordinary demands.
In re O.C. , 338 Ill. Appd 292, 788 N.E.2d 116, 273 Ill. Dec. 287 (4th Dist. 2003). Despite explicit medical testimony that respondent could unknowingly act out, respondent’s boisterous and loud behavior, and a statement by respondent such as “I’m going to kill you,” there was no evidence respondent ever harmed himself or anyone else, evidence showed that any threats that he had made were made to no one in particular, and respondent said he “told people off” to relieve his frustrations; therefore, there was no evidence presented that respondent was reasonably expected to act out by inflicting serious physical harm upon himself or another as a result of his mental illness.
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. Appd 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). Evidence that the respondent said he would "kick [his outpatient caseworker's] ass … or something similar to that" if he were not allowed to buy his own groceries and that, once admitted to the hospital, he was angry, loud, and verbally aggressive constituted clear and convincing evidence that he was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future, and, on appeal, the trial court's order for involuntary admission was affirmed.
In re Moore, 301 Ill. Appd 759, 704 N.E.2d 442, 235 Ill. Dec. 93 (4th Dist. 1999). Rejecting the de novo standard to review the respondent’s argument that the State had not proved him reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm, the Court found that, given the evidence of the respondent’s depression, alcohol abuse, and past suicide attempts, the trial court’s order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re M.A., 293 Ill. Appd 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill. Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). In this consolidated case, after declining to apply the mootness doctrine, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s order for admission. The order for in-patient admission was not manifestly erroneous because the respondent had told a nurse to “watch” herself when walking to the parking lot and had struggled with sheriff’s deputies, establishing that she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm, and, because the doctor opined that alternatives to hospitalization were not appropriate, establishing that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative.
In re Schumaker, 260 Ill. Appd 723, 633 N.E.2d 169, 198 Ill. Dec. 707 (2nd Dist. 1994). To satisfy its burden of proof, the State must present an explicit medical opinion and factual evidence that the respondent intends to harm someone. In this case, there was no explicit medical opinion, and evidence that the respondent was verbally abusive was insufficient. Thus, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Friberg, 249 Appd 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill. Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). Affirming the trial court's order, the Appellate Court ruled that testimony that the respondent restrained his mother prior to admission and broke a window and threatened to kill staff after admission constituted clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm.
In re Hilton, 189 Ill. Appd 821, 545 N.E.2d 757, 137 Ill. Dec. 104 (3d Dist. 1989). Testimony that the respondent was bipolar and delusional, abused alcohol, threatened to kill hospital staff, claimed to have killed a policeman in the past, and believed that violence was an effective response to difficult interpersonal relations established that he was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm in the near future.
In re Cutsinger, 186 Ill. Appd 219, 542 N.E.2d 414, 134 Ill. Dec. 235 (2d Dist. 1989). Facts upon which medical opinion is based as well as medical testimony must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Testimony that respondent was verbally abusive, without clear and convincing evidence of harm to self or others or threats thereof, insufficient basis for opinion. (While petition alleged inability to provide for physical needs so as to guard self from serious harm, and testimony so indicated, certificates, including one from physician who testified, did not so indicate, and court made finding on premise of harm to self or others; State did not raise inability to guard on appeal).
In re Orr, 176 Ill. Appd 498, 531 N.E.2d 64, 125 Ill. Dec. 885 (4th Dist. 1988). Hearsay evidence can be used to form opinion if it is type reasonably relied upon by experts.
Psychiatric history of patient in conjunction with expert's personal observations can be used to support opinion as to dangerousness.
Sullivan v. Hay, 140 Ill. Appd 1007, 489 N.E.2d 889 (5th Dist. 1986). Testimony of medical expert based in part on past events is sufficient for determination of current mental illness and dangerousness.
In re Cochran, 139 Ill. Appd 198, 487 N.E.2d 389, 93 Ill. Dec. 722 (5th Dist. 1985). Involuntary hospitalization requires explicit medical testimony that as a direct result of mental illness respondent can be expected to harm self or others. Facts upon which medical opinion is based as well as medical testimony must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Hearsay evidence that respondent knocked medications from nurse's hand insufficient. Delusions alone are insufficient to support finding of need for involuntary admission; must demonstrate reasonable expectation that respondent will seriously harm someone in the near future as a result thereof.
People v. Nunn, 108 Ill. Appd 169, 438 N.E.2d 1342, 64 Ill. Dec. 23 (1st Dist. 1982). Decision to commit must be based on present conduct and state of mind; cannot be based on possibility that respondent would inflict harm if failed to take medication in future, and refusal to take meds is not sufficient to justify commitment--such an order would "lead to the unacceptable result of permanent detention". Evidence did not demonstrate refusal to take medication and seemed to indicate contrary. Order must be based upon danger as a direct result of mental illness, i.e., there must be a causal connection.
People v. Czyz, 92 Ill. Appd 21, 416 N.E.2d 1, 48 Ill. Dec. 106 (1st Dist. 1980). Decision to involuntarily admit must be based upon present conduct and state of mind; respondent entitled to current evaluation. Evidence of mental illness less than one month before hearing, despite expert testimony that few persons are considered completely recovered from a prior mental illness in such a period, not clear and convincing evidence of current mental illness. Also, where expert testified that "it all depends on stresses he will meet", no explicit opinion of dangerousness to others.
In re Powell, 85 Ill. Appd 877, 407 N.E.2d 658, 41 Ill. Dec. 160 (1st Dist. 1980). Expert testimony that respondent's delusions about money owed him would cause him to pursue collection attempts and this would place him in position of harming others is clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness.
People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979). Criminal charge of UST defendant, found innocent in "innocent only" hearing, cannot be used to establish dangerousness for subsequent involuntary commitment.
People v. Fields, 60 Ill. App .3d 869, 377 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist. 1978). Isolated incident of public nudity and suicide threat, which respondent indicated she never intended to carry out and where no attempts to harm self, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness to self. Evidence that respondent adequately cared for personal hygiene, finances, food and clothing demonstrated ability to care for self.
In re Bradley, 22 Ill. Appd 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1st Dist. 1974). Through sworn testimony from a doctor, and through unsworn testimony of an unidentified social worker, the State presented testimony that the respondent had had been violent in a courtroom after having been charged with disorderly conduct at the hospital bedside of his wife and the expert opinion that the respondent "could conceivably" be dangerous. The respondent testified that he had never been asked to leave his wife's bedside and that he was assaulted from behind by the courtroom bailiffs. The trial court committed the respondent, but the Appellate Court reversed, ruling that neither the opinion nor its factual basis was clear and convincing.
B(3). Clear and Convincing Evidence: Needs
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). In determining whether a person's illness renders her unable to provide for her basic physical needs, a court should consider whether that person (1) can obtain her own food, shelter, or necessary medical care; (2) has a place to live or a family to assist her; (3) is able to function in society; and (4) has an understanding of money or a concern for money as a means of sustenance.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The evidence to support these findings that respondent is mentally ill and cannot support herself must concern the respondent's current condition, and the decision to commit the respondent must be based on a fresh evaluation of her conduct and mental state.
In re Emmett J., 333 Ill. Appd 69, 266 Ill. Dec. 631, 775 N.E.2d 193 (3rd Dist. 2002). The respondent was delusional, refused to take psychotropic medication, was uncertain where he would live if discharged from the hospital, was estranged from his family, and had been in either a treatment facility or jail for the past 10 years. As a result, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court's finding that he was unable to provide for his basic physical needs was not manifestly erroneous.
In re Jakush, 311 Ill. Appd 940, 725 N.E.2d 785, 244 Ill. Dec12 (4th Dist. 2000). Finding that the respondent had no visible means of support and that it was "only a matter of time" before she would be the victim of a "violent act," the trial court found that the respondent was unable to meet her basic physical needs and ordered her to be involuntarily hospitalized. The Appellate Court reversed. First, being without visible means of support is not a proper ground for involuntary admission. Second, there was no evidence that the respondent had ever been victimized, and being vulnerable "does not warrant preemptive confinement whereby potential victims would be incarcerated in the interest of preventing criminals from preying upon them."
People v. Barichello, 305 Ill. Appd 13, 711 N.E.2d 406, 238 Ill. Dec03 (1st Dist. 1999). After hearing conflicting expert testimony, the trial court found that the UST defendant was subject to involuntary admission. Having been confined continuously for 14 years, the defendant had not demonstrated his ability to meet his basic physical needs and his mental illness was not in remission. The Appellate Court affirmed.
In re Robinson, 287 Ill. Appd 1088, 679 N.E.2d 818, 223 Ill. Dec67 (4th Dist. 1997). In this consolidated case, the Appellate Court affirmed the order for admission, finding that the State had proved that the respondent was unable to meet her basic physical needs because she was delusional, stayed at shelters where she was robbed, and had difficulty explaining how she would obtain food.
In re Bontrager, 286 Ill. Appd 226, 676 N.E.2d 4, 221 Ill. Dec. 664 (3rd Dist. 1996). In this appeal from both an order for involuntary admission and involuntary treatment, the Appellate Court reversed both orders for being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In the admission case, although the petition claimed that the respondent had not eaten in three months, the doctor testified that he had little information about her eating habits; and, because the respondent testified about her discharge plan, the State had not proven that she was unable to meet her basic physical needs.
In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. Appd 956, 667 N.E.2d 720 (2nd Dist. 1996). The trial court's finding that the respondent was unable to meet his basic physical needs was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State presented no evidence regarding the respondent's ability to secure food and shelter but instead presented evidence only of his mental illness and his poor hygiene.
In re Tuman, 268 Ill. Appd 106, 644 N.E.2d 56, 205 Ill. Dec. 840 (2d Dist. 1994). While evidence supporting expert opinion must not necessarily be substantively admitted, where State offers no additional evidence such as occurrence witness testimony or relevant documents, court must carefully examine expert testimony to determine if it is clear and convincing standing alone. Here expert's testimony alone was insufficient to demonstrate that respondent was unable to guard herself from serious physical harm; no evidence of inability to obtain shelter, food or necessary medical care or understand the need for money.
In re Schumaker, 260 Ill. Appd 723, 633 N.E.2d 169, 198 Ill. Dec. 707 (2nd Dist. 1994). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for admission because the State presented only evidence that the respondent may have been refusing psychotropic medication and may be unable to find a job or balance a checkbook, and this evidence was insufficient.
In re Winters, 255 Ill. Appd 605, 627 N.E.2d 410, 194 Ill. Dec. 294 (2d Dist. 1994). "A person may not be confined against her will merely because she is mentally ill and if she is 'dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.'" Citing O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U. S. 563. Weight to be assigned expert's opinion depends upon factual basis for opinion; expert's opinion is only as valid as reasons for it.
In this case, the State failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unable to provide for her basic physical needs. Refusal of medication and lack of place to live are insufficient grounds for involuntary admission, and there was no factual basis for the assertions that respondent would not eat or sleep properly, or fail to seek medical attention for perceived health problems.
In re Biggs, 219 Ill. Appd 361, 579 N.E.2d 1170, 162 Ill. Dec. 56 (4th Dist. 1991). Admitting that the expert's testimony was not extensive, the Appellate Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's finding that the respondent was unable to provide for his basic physical needs. The respondent was delusional and might be in danger from members of the public; moreover, the respondent was diagnosed as being bipolar and might have trouble obtaining adequate sleep and food.
In re Phillips, 62 Ill. Appd 408, 379 N.E.2d 97 (1st Dist. 1978). Failure to take medication for a mental, as opposed to physical, disorder does not prove inability to care for self. Uncertainty of living arrangements if released insufficient basis for commitment.
People v. Fields, 60 Ill. App .3d 869, 377 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist. 1978). Evidence that respondent adequately cared for personal hygiene, finances, food and clothing demonstrated ability to care for self.
Matter of Doe, 56 Ill. Appd 1052, 372 N.E.2d 866 (1st Dist. 1978). Indigence alone insufficient for involuntary admission; impermissible to hospitalize someone merely to raise their standard of living.
In re Love, 48 Ill. Appd 517, 363 N.E.2d 21 (1st Dist. 1977). Present and future ability to care for self, rather than past ability, is to be considered in involuntary commitment hearing.
B(4).Clear and Convincing Evidence: Least restrictive alternative/dispositional report/treatment plan
In re M.A., 356 Ill. Appd 733, 826 N.E.2d 1071, 292 Ill. Dec. 635 (1st Dist. 2005) [Note: Original case was in 1998.] Sections 3-810 and 3-811 of Mental Health Code do not require that court conduct bifurcated hearing to first determine whether respondent is subject to involuntary admission and then determine whether less restrictive alternatives are available. 405 ILCS 5/3-810 & 5/3-811.
In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The court has several options at its disposal: ordering hospitalization, ordering outpatient treatment, or ordering the person to be placed in the care of a relative or other person willing to care properly for him. However, there is a statutory preference for treatment other than hospitalization. Thus, hospitalization may only be ordered if the State proves it is the least restrictive treatment alternative . . . not met merely because the State's expert opines commitment is the least restrictive means. The opinion of the expert must be supported by the evidence.
In re Emmett J., 333 Ill. Appd 69, 266 Ill. Dec. 631, 775 N.E.2d 193 (3rd Dist. 2002). Where the respondent was delusional and refused to take psychotropic medication, his placement in a group home was not viable, and the trial court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative was not manifestly erroneous.
In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill. Appd 476, 746 N.E.2d 769, 254 Ill. Dec. 1012 (2nd Dist. 2001). Because the State completely failed to comply with Section 3-810, the trial court's order was reversed. The State failed to file a written dispositional report and failed to provide adequate oral testimony. Although both of the State's experts opined that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative, they "neither explained the basis for [their] opinion nor mentioned any other alternatives that were considered."
In re E.L., 316 Ill. App. 3d 598 , 736 N.E.2d 1189, 249 Ill. Dec. 751 (1st Dist. 2000). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order for involuntary admission because the State failed to prepare the dispositional report required by Section 3-810. The document purporting to be the dispositional report contained no information on "the appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment settings," and, because the respondent's counsel had objected to the lack of a proper written report, "any oral testimony on what would have been contained in the report is of no effect."
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. Appd 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). Where the State's expert testifies that the respondent may be dangerous if not confined in a hospital, the trial court's ruling that hospitalization is the least restrictive alternative is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re David D., 307 Ill. Appd 30, 716 N.E.2d 1245, 240 Ill. Dec. 298 (2nd Dist. 1999). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's finding that inpatient hospitalization was the least restrictive, appropriate environment in which to treat the respondent, even though the State's expert witness presented no testimony that the respondent had been rejected by any specific alternative treatment settings.
In re Robert H., 302 Ill. Appd 980, 707 N.E.2d 264, 236 Ill. Dec. 419 (2nd Dist. 1999). Trial court's order for hospitalization upheld, even though the State did not submit a written dispositional report and the State's expert witness presented no testimony that the respondent had been rejected by any specific alternative treatment settings.
In re M.A., 293 Ill. Appd 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill. Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). Because the State's expert witness opined that alternatives to hospitalization were not appropriate, State established that hospitalization was the least restrictive, appropriate environment for the respondent.
In re Katz, 267 Ill. Appd 692, 642 N.E.2d 893, 205 Ill. Dec. 28 (3d Dist. 1994). No requirements for showing of inpatient placement as least restrictive alternative under 3-810 where recipient filed 3-900 Petition for Discharge and trial court properly found she failed to present prima facie case.
In re Luttrel, 261 Ill. Appd 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill. Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1994). Failure to file current treatment plan as required by 3-813(a) and insufficiency of oral testimony presented requires reversal of trial court's order for hospitalization. The Code provides a statutory preference for treatment other than hospitalization; State failed to demonstrate that continued involuntary inpatient hospitalization was least restrictive alternative.
In re Watts, 250 Ill, App, 3d 723, 620 N.E.2d 640, 189 Ill. Dec. 672 (5th Dist. 1993). Absence of report required by 3-810 of the Code is recognizable as plain error, relying on James, 191 Ill, Appd 352. Second certificate does not qualify as 3-810 report and total failure of compliance is clear.
In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 176 Ill.Dec. 14, 601 N.E.2d 712 (1992). Legislature intended that 3-810 report be in writing, but where there was no objection to absence of predisposition report, strict compliance is only required where legislative intent cannot be otherwise achieved; here oral testimony containing information required provided substantial compliance and was adequate substitute for report prepared by facility director and error was harmless; Blume, 197 Ill. Appd 552 overruled. [Section 3-810 of the Code has since been amended to explicitly require that the dispositional report be in writing.]
In re Long, 237 Ill. Appd 105, 180 Ill. Dec. 182, 606 N.E.2d 1259 (2d Dist. 1992). Despite respondent's rejection of halfway house option, finding that hospitalization was least restrictive alternative was against the manifest weight of the evidence when Elgin MHC and medication were only elements of treatment plan. Respondent's dislike of halfway house is irrelevant to court's consideration and determination of LRA. The State presented no evidence that she had been rejected by any program or that program was inappropriate, and Code expresses preference for program other than hospitalization.
In re Friberg, 249 Appd 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill. Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). Affirming the trial court's order, the Appellate Court that the dispositional report and testimony that the respondent had broken a window and needed inpatient care constituted clear and convincing evidence that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative.
In re Long, 233 Ill. Appd 334, 599 N.E.2d 90, 174 Ill. Dec. 544 (2d Dist. 1992). Having heard testimony that the respondent had lost weight, had no home, and had no job, the trial court's order for hospitalization was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Devine, 214 Ill. Appd 1, 157 Ill. Dec. 774, 572 N.E.2d 238 (2d Dist. 1991). While the Code directs the trial court to order the least restrictive alternative, it does not require that the court make a specific finding that the ordered treatment is the least restrictive alternative.
In re Lamb, 202 Ill. Appd 725, 560 N.E.2d 422, 148 Ill. Dec. 120 (2d Dist. 1990). Failure to file current treatment plan is reversible error, and is neither harmless nor waived. Cursory witness testimony about treatment plan is insufficient, as is previous treatment plan. Section 3-813 requires "current" treatment plan prepared by facility director or by a person directed to do so by the court. "These provisions are all very detailed given that liberty interests are involved. The State must be willing to follow the statutory mandates..."
In re James, 191 Ill. Appd 352, 547 N.E.2d 759, 138 Ill. Dec. 592 (4th Dist. 1989). Failure of record to demonstrate preparation or consideration of treatment plan before disposition is non-waivable error.
In
re Smoots, 189 Ill. Appd 289, 544 N.E.2d 1235, 136 Ill. Dec. 460 (4th Dist. 1989). Incomplete record on dispositional report issue resolved against appellant where testimony indicated that one existed, even though it was not part of the record.
In re Plank, 169 Ill. Appd 411, 523 N.E.2d 614, 119 Ill. Dec. 858 (4th Dist. 1988). New and current treatment plan must be filed for each successive petition; this error not subject to waiver.
In re Meek, 131 Ill. Appd 742, 476 N.E.2d 65, 86 Ill. Dec. 889 (4th Dist. 1985). Objections to sufficiency of dispositional report waived if not raised in trial court before disposition determined.
In re Collins, 102 Ill. Appd 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill. Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Trial court required to consider treatment plan prior to disposition. Failure of mental health facility staff to provide 3-810 dispositional report was "but one further indication that certain staff within the [Department] are performing their duties with either callous or blithe disregard for the rules. Such a situation cannot be condoned."
Matter of Langdon, 53 Ill. Appd 768, 368 N.E.2d 1143 (3d Dist. 1977). DMHDD, not court, in best position to make determination as to particular institution within which involuntary treatment should take place; court not authorized to order specific DMHDD facility.
B(5). Clear and Convincing Evidence: In general
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that if the State adduces no valid evidentiary basis for the relief it sought, it necessarily follows that it has failed to establish its case by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. Appd 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). Proof of mental illness alone is not a sufficient reason to confine a person against her will if she is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom; neither is a desire to improve a person’s standard of living or because society may find it uncomfortable to see such people on the street.
In re Alfred H., 358 Ill. Appd 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). JUSTICE KNECHT, dissenting: Respondent might benefit from involuntary admission. Perhaps he will bathe more often and be more compliant. Perhaps his presently harmless delusions will diminish. Medication may improve his disposition and modify his behavior. However, he should not suffer a loss of liberty and be forcibly administered painful injections simply to make him a more agreeable member of our society.
In re John R. , 339 Ill. Appd 778, 792 N.E.2d 350, 275 Ill. Dec. 119 (5th Dist. 2003). Evidence necessary to infringe on liberty interests must be “real, clear, and convincing.”
In re Lawrence, 239 111. Appd 424, 180 Ill. Dec. 590, 607 N.E.2d 659 (2d Dist. 1992); In re Weimer, 219 Ill. Appd 1005, 162 Ill. Dec. 556, 580 N.E.2d 182 (2d Dist. 1991). Petition and allegations thereon serve only as showing of probable cause to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings and do not constitute evidence.
People v. Lang, 189 Ill. Appd 384, 545 N.E.2d 327, 136 Ill. Dec. 803 (1st Dist. 1989). Same substantive evidence is required to sustain involuntary commitment whether initial or further commitment.
In re Williams, 151 Ill. Appd 911, 503 N.E.2d 816, 104 Ill. Dec. 954 (2d Dist. 1987). No error in admission of prior history of respondent where trial court recognized that decision to involuntary admit could be based only upon present condition.
In re Collins, 102 Ill. Appd 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 57 Ill. Dec. 633 (4th Dist. 1981). Certificates are not substantive evidence and cannot provide basis for involuntary hospitalization.
In re Evans, 86 Ill. Appd 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill. Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Certificates serve to establish probable cause for emergency admission, are not evidence, and cannot be used to support involuntary admission order.
In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273 (1977). Fundamental liberty interest v. society's interest in protection requires clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for involuntary admission.
Matter of Whitehouse, 56 Ill. Appd 245, 371 N.E.2d 990 (1st Dist. 1977). Clear and convincing evidence must be established in certain, definite and unequivocal terms and be so convincing that it will leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the court; facts upon which medical opinion is based must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, medical testimony must be clear and convincing.
Peop
le v. Sansone, 18 Ill. Appd 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1974). Medical opinion as to need for involuntary hospitalization must be clear and convincing, and the facts upon which it is based must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
r, 4 Ill. 2d 442, 123 N.E.2d 321 (1954). Medical opinion must be stated and supporting facts established in certain, definite and unequivocal terms and be so convincing the they will leave no doubt in the mind of the court.
C. Order for admission
In re Alfred H. , 358 Ill. Appd 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). A trial court's order authorizing involuntary admission can only be in effect for up to six months. See 405 ILCS 5/4-611(a).
In re Tammy D. , 339 Ill. Appd 419, 790 N.E.2d 410, 274 Ill. Dec4 (5th Dist. 2003). Respondent agreed to the entry of an order requiring her to attend outpatient treatment and then filed a motion to vacate the order for outpatient treatment arguing that while she was willing to participate in outpatient treatment, there was no statutory authority that could require her to do so. She argued that the agreement was the result of coercion, duress, mistake, and grossly disparate bargaining positions between her and the State. While an agreement made under fraud, duress, coercion, unfair dealing, gross disparity in the position or capacity of the parties, or newly discovered evidence can be set aside, here respondent failed to show that was the case but rather showed only that she changed her mind about the agreement. As a matter of law, respondents have the right to settle her case by agreeing to an order for outpatient treatment. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the agreement to be in good faith and denied the motion to vacate.
In re Friberg, 249 Appd 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill. Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). The trial court's order need not explicitly state that the disposition being ordered is the least restrictive.
In re Robinson, 151 111. 2d 126, 176 Ill.Dec. 14, 601 N.E.2d 712 (1992). Section 3-810's provision that initial order for admission shall be for period not to exceed 60 days did not require that order state specific duration of treatment.
In re Grimes, 193 Ill. Appd 119, 549 N.E.2d 616, 139 Ill. Dec. 890 (3d Dist. 1990). No error in failure of trial court to specify on the record factual findings and conclusions. No error in trial court's failure to state duration of order for treatment where order directs reader to reverse side where statement is made that initial order valid for no more than sixty days. Where record fails to show that respondent or counsel received copy of order, must presume counsel received copy.
In re Orr, 176 Ill. Appd 498, 531 N.E.2d 64, 125 Ill. Dec. 885 (4th Dist. 1988). Involuntary hospitalization order which included DMHDD authority to forcibly administer medications was void for want of statutory authority.
People v. C.T., 137 Ill. Appd 42, 484 N.E.2d 361 (5th Dist. 1985). Where court imposes sentence in excess of what statute permits, legal and authorized portion of sentence is not void but excess portion is void.
In re Gardner, 121 Ill. Appd 7, 459 N.E.2d 17, 76 Ill. Dec. 608 (4th Dist. 1984). The only methods and procedures by which one may be admitted to a mental health facility are those specified in the MHDD Code.
In re Evans, 86 Ill. Appd 263, 408 N.E.2d 33, 41 Ill. Dec. 687 (4th Dist. 1980). Order stating that respondent is mentally ill, unable to provide for basic needs, and is a person subject to involuntary hospitalization is sufficient to meet requirement of 3-816(a) for court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dissent: Conclusory statements of trial judge fail to meet 3-816(a)
requirements; conclusory statements of expert insufficient to meet clear and convincing standard.
People v. Valdez, 79 Ill. 2d 74, 402 N.E.2d 187, 37 Ill. Dec. 297 (1980). Court had jurisdiction to order implementation of specific court-designed treatment plan for NGRI patient, and was not restricted to either modifying original order or ordering discharge.
Matter of Langdon, 53 Ill. Appd 768, 368 N.E.2d 1143 (3d Dist. 1977). DMHDD, not court, in best position to make determination as to particular institution within which involuntary treatment should take place; court not authorized to order specific DMHDD facility.