V(A). APPEALS: Mootness
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). The petition was filed without a certificate in violation of 405 ILCS 5/3-602. Respondent was discharged before the case reached the appellate court. Since the case involved an event of short duration, capable of repetition yet evades review, the court addressed the issues raised by the respondent.
In re Nancy A. , 342 Ill. App. 3d 355, 795 N.E.2d 377, 277 Ill. Dec. 10 (5th Dist. 2003). Generally, the mootness doctrine does not apply to mental health cases (citing, In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 1998 ). Because the challenged order has already expired and there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent will be subjected to the same action again, we shall apply the exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Tammy D. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 419, 790 N.E.2d 410, 274 Ill. Dec. 34 (5th Dist. 2003). A moot action is reviewable if (1) the duration of the challenged action made it too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent could be subjected to the same action again.
In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310, 273 Ill. Dec. 1 (5th Dist. 2003). The procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental health patients are a matter of “substantial public concern.” Therefore even though both parties had changed their position before the appellate briefs were filed, this appeal fell within the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 820 N.E.2d 424, 289 Ill. Dec. 648 (2004). A reviewing court may review otherwise moot issues pursuant to the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The criteria for application of the public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The appellate court has recognized mental health cases are an exception to the rule not to decide moot questions.
Mirar Dev. v. Kroner, 308 Ill. App. 3d 483, 720 N.E.2d 270, 241 Ill.Dec. 815 (3rd Dist. 1999); Bailey v. Meador, 91 Ill. App. 3d 143, 414 N.E.2d 279, 46 Ill. Dec. 557 (3rd Dist. 1980). If evidence exists that would support the application of the mootness doctrine, the State has a duty to make it a part of the record utilizing Supreme Court Rule 329. This is because where there may be events occurring after the entry of a judgment which might render issues on appeal moot, those events or occurrences need be presented in some appropriate form such as a supplement to the record. Although a brief may allude to facts which a party argues renders an appeal moot, without such supplementation, there is no adequate basis in the record to dismiss for mootness.
Muellner v. Blessing Hosp., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 782 N.E.2d 799, 270 Ill. Dec. 240 (2002). Although moot, the Appellate Court decided the merits of the case, and determined that a guardian can admit a ward to a nursing home's behavioral care unit only by complying with the admission provisions of the Mental Health Code, because the case fell within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 781 N.E.2d 237, 269 Ill. Dec. 440 (2002). Although the trial court's order for involuntary medication had expired and the case was moot, the Supreme Court decided the case on the merits, and determined that Section 2-107.1 does not permit selective authorization, because the case fell within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Jennifer H., 226 Ill. Dec. 776, 775 N.E.2d 616 (3rd Dist. 2002). In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65, 759 N.E.2d 1020, 259 Ill. Dec. 959 (2nd Dist. 2001); In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d 335, 760 N.E.2d 579, 260 Ill. Dec. 162 (2nd Dist. 2001); In re Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d 203, 749 N.E.2d 1082, 255 Ill. Dec. 600 (2nd Dist. 2001); In re Jones/In re Wheeler, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 743 N.E.2d 1090, 252 Ill. Dec. 934 (5th Dist. 2001); In re Nancy M, 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 739 N.E.2d 607, 250 Ill. Dec. 844 (2nd Dist. 2000); In re Dennis D., 303 Ill. App. 3d 442, 707 N.E.2d 667, 236 Ill. Dec. 540 (1st Dist. 1999); In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 704 N.E.2d 943, 235 Ill. Dec. 370 (2nd Dist. 1999); In re M.A., 293 Ill. App. 3d 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill. Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). In each of these cases, the Appellate Court reached the merits of the case by applying the "of short duration, capable of evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998), affirming on other grounds, 288 Ill. App. 3d 360, 680 N.E.2d 471, 223 Ill. Dec. 738 (2nd Dist. 1997). Although both the trial court’s admission and medication orders had expired and the case was moot, the Supreme Court relied on an exception to the mootness doctrine, and decided the merits of this case, because it involved an event of short duration, capable of repetition, but evading review.
In re Branning, 285 Ill. App. 3d 405, 674 N.E.2d 463, 220 Ill. Dec. 920 (4th Dist. 1997). To reach the merits of the appeal, the Appellate Court relied on both the public interest and the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
In re Austwick, 275 Ill. App. 3d 769, 656 N.E.2d 779, 212 Ill. Dec. 182 (1st Dist. 1995). Although moot, the Court decided the merits of this case by applying the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 157 Ill. Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991). The Supreme Court decided the merits of this case, despite its mootness, to avoid adverse collateral consequences for the respondent, to relieve uncertainties in the law, and to improve the operation of the system of justice.
In re Thompson, 215 Ill. App. 3d 986, 575 N.E.2d 975, 159 Ill. Dec. 168 (3rd Dist. 1991). Although a respondent's voluntary admission which occurs after the involuntary admission which is the subject of appeal may eliminate all future adverse collateral consequences, the respondent's subsequent involuntary admission does not. Therefore, the Court applied the collateral consequences exception and declined to dismiss the case as moot.
In re Riviere, 183 Ill. App. 3d 456, 539 N.E.2d 452, 132 Ill. Dec. 141 (3rd Dist. 1989); In re Graham, 40 Ill. App. 3d 452, 352 N.E.2d 387 (1st Dist. 1976). The Appellate Court in these cases refused to dismiss the moot mental health cases because orders for involuntary mental health treatment may have adverse collateral consequences for the respondent long after the order has expired.
In re Cochran, 139 Ill. App. 3d 198, 487 N.E.2d 389 (5th Dist. 1985); In re Hays, 115 Ill. App. 3d 686, 451 N.E.2d 9 (4th Dist. 1983) aff'd. 102 Ill. 2d 314, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984); In re Garcia, 59 Ill. App .3d 500, 375 N.E.2d 557 (1st Dist. 1978). Mental health cases constitute a general exception to the mootness doctrine.
In re Meek, 131 Ill. App. 3d 742, 476 N.E.2d 65 (4th Dist. 1985). Appeal not moot even where respondent was discharged and subsequently voluntarily admitted.
People v. Nunn, 108 Ill. App. 3d 169, 438 N.E.2d 1342 (1st Dist. 1982); In re Wathan, 104 Ill. App. 3d 64, 432 N.E.2d 670 (4th Dist. 1982); In re Marquardt, 100 Ill. App. 3d 741, 427 N.E.2d 411, 56 Ill. Dec. 331 (1st Dist. 1981). Dismissal of mental health commitment orders of short duration for mootness would remove an entire class of cases from gaining appellate review.
In re Phillips, 62 Ill. App. 3d 408, 379 N.E.2d 97 (1st Dist. 1978); People v. Fields, 60 Ill. App. 3d 869, 377 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist. 1978). Mootness rejected even though respondent had prior commitments; collateral consequences may exist even for a person who has been committed several times previously.
In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 375 N.E.2d 557, 10 Ill. Dec. 507 (1st Dist. 1978). Deciding mental health appeals, despite their mootness, is useful in providing guidance to the courts.
V(B). APPEALS: Waiver/Plain error/Strict compliance/Harmless error
In re N.S., No. 4-04-0942 (4th Dist. Sept. 7, 2005), 2005 WL 2821816, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1065. Respondent has been the victim of procedural error evident on the face of the record. Therefore, the issue is reviewable under a doctrine analogous to plain error.
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). The need for strict compliance with the statutory requirements is compelling in mental health cases since commitment is involuntary and liberty interest are involved.
In re Nancy A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 355, 795 N.E.2d 377, 277 Ill. Dec. 10 (5th Dist. 2003). Failure to timely file a petition for involuntary commitment is an error that cannot be waived or considered harmless. 405 ILCS 5/3-611 creates a bright-line test with which the facility director must strictly comply. The procedural safeguards are intended to safeguard important liberty interests necessarily involved in mental health cases.
In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). In an involuntary admission hearing, the failure to raise an issue to the trial court generally results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.
In re Christopher P., 342 Ill. App. 3d 336, 795 N.E.2d 323, 276 Ill. Dec. 970 (5th Dist. 2003). Contrary to the State’s contention, the right of written notification is not subject to a harmless error analysis, because the statutory rights ensure that the respondent’s due process rights are met and protected. (involved notice of risks and benefits of medications)
In re Christopher P., 342 Ill. App. 3d 336, 795 N.E.2d 323, 276 Ill. Dec. 970 (5th Dist. 2003). The necessity for strict compliance with mental health statutory provisions is compelling due to the fact that liberty interests are involved. The Code’s procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities but essential tools to safeguard the liberty interests of mental health patients.
In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792 N.E.2d 350, 275 Ill. Dec. 119 (5th Dist. 2003). The Mental Health Code protects fundamental liberty interests, and procedural safeguards are not “mere technicalities, but essential tools to safeguard these liberty interests.” Procedural safeguards must be construed in respondent’s favor and be strictly complied with.
Even where the physician has verbally advised the patient of the benefits and side effects of the medication and the patient has informed the physician that he chooses not to take the medication, the patient is still entitled to receive the written notification required by section 2-102 of the Code. Verbal notification is not enough to ensure a respondent's due process rights. Nor is harmless error analysis appropriate to this question.
In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65, 759 N.E.2d 1020, 259 Ill. Dec. 959 (2nd Dist. 2001). Because the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication implicates fundamental liberty interests, the Appellate Court reviewed, and reversed, the trial court's order for medication, even though no objection had been made below.
In re Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d 203, 749 N.E.2d 1082, 255 Ill. Dec. 600 (2nd Dist. 2001); In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 734 N.E.2d 13, 248 Ill. Dec. 305 (3rd Dist. 2000); In re Len P., 302 Ill. App. 3d 281, 706 N.E.2d 104, 235 Ill. Dec. 844 (2nd Dist. 1999); In re DeLong, 289 Ill. App. 3d 842, 682 N.E.2d 1189, 225 Ill. Dec. 112 (3rd Dist. 1997); In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 667 N.E.2d 720, 217 Ill. Dec. 631 (2nd Dist. 1996); In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 646 N.E.2d 27, 206 Ill. Dec. 895 (2nd Dist. 1995); In re LaTouche, 247 Ill. App. 3d 615, 617 N.E.2d 844, 187 N.E.2d 387 (2nd Dist. 1993); In re Watts, 250 Ill. App. 3d 723, 620 N.E.2d 640, 189 Ill. Dec. 672 (5th Dist. 1993); In re Stone, 178 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 534 N.E.2d 213, 128 Ill. Dec. 193 (3rd Dist. 1989) . Although no objections were made in the trial court, the reviewing court can examine allegations of non-compliance with the Mental Health Code by using the plain error doctrine.
In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 739 N.E.2d 607, 250 Ill. Dec. 844 (2nd Dist. 2000). Although no objection had been made to the use of a general verdict form in a trial held under Section 2-107.1, the Appellate Court reviewed the error because the respondent's liberty interests were at stake and because the alleged error was so substantial as to impact the fairness and integrity of the trial.
In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 712 N.E.2d 422, 238 Ill. Dec. 700 (2nd Dist. 1999); In re Floyd, 274 Ill. App. 3d 855, 655 N.E.2d 10, 211 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1995); In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 607 N.E.2d 681, 180 Ill. Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1993); In re James, 191 Ill. App. 3d 352, 547 N.E.2d 759, 138 Ill. Dec. 592 (1989). Because mental health hearings put liberty interests at risk, alleged errors may be reviewed on appeal under the plain error doctrine.
Radazewski v Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 639 N.E.2d 141, 203 Ill. Dec. 102 (1994). Detention in a mental health facility implicates substantial liberty interest and statutes governing involuntary admission are to be narrowly construed except where compliance requires "performance of empty formality"
In re Lutrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill. Dec. 612 (4th Dist. 1994). "We feel compelled to express our continuing dismay at the slipshod manner with which these cases are handled. The procedural safeguards enacted by the legislature are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are intended to safeguard the important liberty interests of the respondent which are involved in mental health cases. (cite omitted) In furtherance of this goal, the legislature has clearly set forth a specific time frame during which certain events in the commitment process must occur, and certain information must be presented to the court. Despite the significance and clarity of these procedural safeguards, the cases which have come before the courts of review indicate they are routinely disregarded by the State. (cites omitted) As we have previously noted, involuntary commitment procedures represent the balance between an individual's liberty interests and society's dual interests in protecting itself from potentially dangerous individuals while protecting and caring for those who are unable to care for themselves. The total disregard for the legislatively established procedures is contrary to the balancing of interests established by the Code and should not be condoned."
In re Clark, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 163 Ill. Dec. 457, 581 N.E.2d 408 (4th Dist. 1991). While strict compliance with the Code is necessary to protect the rights of those involuntarily committed and certain errors apparent on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous despite waiver at trial, errors here were corrected by trial court or harmless. (1st petition dismissed but order for detention/examination entered; second petition accompanied by only one certificate; third petition accompanied by two certificates prior to hearing, which proceeded on third petition after dismissal of second; improper notice.) Rejecting Clarke's arguments, the court nonetheless closed, "...we are singularly unimpressed with the efforts of the Department and the State's Attorney...to follow statutory procedures..." 581 N.E.2d at 460. Clarke had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, continued to make threats and was the subject of an ongoing investigation for solicitation of murder.
In re Valentine, 201 Ill. App. 3d 10, 558 N.E.2d 807 (5th Dist. 1990); Matter of Satterlee, 148 Ill. App. 3d 84, 499 N.E.2d 101 (4th Dist. 1986). Implication of serious liberty interests requires strict compliance with statutory procedures.
In re Clarke, 200 Ill. App. 3d 365, 558 N.E.2d 719 (2d Dist. 1990); Matter of Elkow, 167 Ill. App. 3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290 (4th Dist. 1988); In re King, 148 Ill. App. 3d 741, 499 N.E.2d 1032 (4th Dist. 1987); In re Price, 152 Ill. App. 3d 960, 505 N.E.2d 37 (4th Dist. 1987); In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1986). Any non-compliance with mandated procedures renders the trial court's judgment erroneous and of no effect. Issues are not waived by respondent's failure to object.
In re Franklin, 186 Ill. App. 3d 245, 541 N.E.2d 168 (4th Dist. 1989). Respondent's failure to object to defects in pleadings, where clear on the face of the record, is not a waiver of her right to object on appeal.
In re Vancil, 183 Ill. App. 3d 204, 538 N.E.2d 1372 (3d Dist. 1989). Unambiguous statutory involuntary commitment procedures affecting liberty interests will be strictly enforced.
In re Riviere, 183 Ill. App. 3d 456, 539 N.E.2d 451 (3d Dist. 1989). "We want to make clear...that we do not condone disregard for the statutory requirements which protect the rights of persons subject to involuntary admission procedures. Illinois courts have said that strict compliance with the procedural safeguards of the Mental Health Code is essential since liberty interests are involved. [cite omitted] Nonetheless, until such time as the legislature sees fit to provide a meaningful remedy in cases such as this one, a reviewing court can only reverse." 183 Ill. App. 3d at 460.
In re Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d 939, 506 N.E.2d 456 (4th Dist. 1987). Civil commitment proceedings were unknown at common law; their existence is derived wholly from statutory enactment. Thus the statutory conditions must be strictly followed.
In re Hays, 115 Ill. App. 3d 686, 451 N.E.2d 9 (4th Dist. 1983) aff'd. 102 Ill. 2d 314 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984). Statutory requirements concerning the rights of a person entitled to discharge must be complied with because of the obvious liberty interests at stake. General discussion concerning voluntary and involuntary admission procedures.
V(C). APPEALS: Jurisdiction
In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec. 395 (4th Dist. 2003) 3-100 did not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over a respondent who was charged with a felony in another state. To construe 3-100 to include those persons who are charged with a felony in another state would render Illinois powerless to involuntarily commit out of state residents present in Illinois who have been charged with a felony in another state.
Respondent was prevented from fully presenting her claim that, because her family lured her into Illinois so she could be involuntarily committed and subjected to authorized involuntary treatment, trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; denial of her motion for continuance so that she could obtain affidavits to support her claim limited her ability to prove her claim. A party may not be induced by artifice, trick or fraud to enter the state for the sole purpose of being served with process.
In re Bates, 315 Ill. App. 3d 736, 734 N.E.2d 459, 248 Ill. Dec. 531 (3rd Dist. 2000). The respondent appealed the trial court's denial of her petition for discharge and, on appeal, also challenged the propriety of her original commitment order. Because the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the original commitment order, any errors in the order rendered it voidable, not void; thus, the original commitment order could not be collaterally attacked while appealing the denial of the petition for discharge.
In re Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d 497, 654 N.E.2d 1084, 211 Ill. Dec. 274 (2d Dist. 1995). Respondent's argument that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because order exceeded authority granted by 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 rejected; rendering erroneous decision does not divest trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, for if court has jurisdiction it is empowered to make a decision, correct or not. (Arguably excessive portion of order found not to be so.)
In re Estate of Ohlman, 259 Ill. App. 3d 120, 630 N.E.2d 1133, 197 Ill. Dec. 9 (1st Dist. 1994). Reviewing court may assume jurisdiction of order appointing guardian under S. Ct. Rule 304 (b)(l) but not under Rule 301. Trial court retains jurisdiction to determine substantial rights of individuals following appointment of guardian, so it is not a final order; it does finally determine rights or status of a party. With respect to trial court's orders for specific psychotherapy sessions (pursuant to OSG's medication petition) reviewing court assumes jurisdiction under Rule 307(a)(l) (interlocutory appeal from injunctive orders) inasmuch as orders operated as constraints on DMHDD's right to determine proper treatment for its patients.
In re Long, 233 Ill. App. 3d 334, 174 Ill. Dec. 544, 599 N.E.2d 90 (2d Dist. 1992). Circuit court is empowered by statute to hear civil commitment cases; alleged deficiencies in notice, judgment order, sufficiency of the pleadings or correctness of trial court's decision do not affect subject matter jurisdiction.
In re Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d 939, 506 N.E.2d 456 (4th Dist. 1987). Non- compliance with statutory prerequisites deprived trial court of jurisdiction.
In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1986). Jurisdictional errors are not waived and may be recognized under a doctrine analogous to plain error.
V(D). APPEALS: Record on Appeal
People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 440 N.E.2d 872, 65 Ill. Dec. 17 (1982); In re Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d 497, 654 N.E.2d 1084, 211 Ill. Dec. 274(2nd Dist. 1995). A court of review must determine the issues before it solely on the basis of the record made in the trial court, and where a party’s argument is unsupported by the record, it must be rejected.
People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. App. 3d 972, 667 N.E.2d 600, 217 Ill. Dec. 511 (1st Dist. 1996)
People v. Eyen, 291 Ill. App. 3d 38, 683 N.E.2d 193, 225 Ill. Dec. 249 (2d Dist. 1997) The only avenue for a party to correct the report of proceedings if it believes it is inaccurate is through Supreme Court Rule 329.
People v. Eyen, 291 Ill. App. 3d 38, 683 N.E.2d 193, 225 Ill. Dec. 249 (2d Dist. 1997) Where a party alleges errors in the transcript and wants to correct it, that party must obtain an affidavit from the court reporter attesting to the errors. If he does not do so, the Court should take the record on appeal as true and correct.
In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 704 N.E.2d 943, 235 Ill. Dec. 370 (2nd Dist. 1999). After a jury trial, the respondent challenged the order for involuntary treatment because, inter alia, there was no verbatim transcript of the voir dire. The Court “strongly suggested” that transcripts be made of all future voir dires, but refused to reverse this case on that issue because the record did not disclose whether or not the respondent had explicitly waived the transcript in the trial court.
In re Friberg, 249 Ill. App. 3d 86, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 187 Ill. Dec. 606 (2d Dist. 1993). Testimony of final State's witness unavailable for transcription since audio tape on which it was recorded was recorded over, no court reporter was available at the hearing. Waiver not at issue where respondent's trial attorney assisted in preparation of agreed statement of facts under S. Ct. Rule 323 (d). Agreed statement was adequate for appeal to proceed and respondent no due process rights denied. Nonetheless case demonstrates weaknesses of audio recording system and the use of court reporters is urged.
In re Smoots, 189 Ill. App. 3d 289, 544 N.E.2d 1235 (4th Dist. 1989). Doubts presented by incomplete record will be resolved against appellant. (Record reference to dispositional report in testimony, but no report of record.)
In re Hays, 115 Ill. App. 3d 686, 451 N.E.2d 9 (4th Dist. 1983), aff'd. 102 Ill. 2d 314, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984). Respondent has right to transcript without cost.
In re Meyer, 107 Ill. App. 3d 871, 438 N.E.2d 639 (2d Dist. 1982). GAC cannot be assessed the costs of proceedings.
V(E). APPEALS: Standard of Review
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). A circuit court’s decision in an involuntary admission proceeding is given great deference.
In re Denise C., 348 Ill. App. 3d 889, 810 N.E.2d 654, 284 Ill. Dec. 864 (1st Dist. 2004). A reviewing court will not reverse a civil commitment for minor deviations in form that cause no prejudice to a respondent.
In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). Errors demonstrating noncompliance with statutory provisions that appear on the face of a record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error.
In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). The issue of whether an involuntary admission was statutorily defective because it did not list the name and address of a substitute decision maker or state that a diligent inquiry had been made to determine if he had one, presents a question of law that we review de novo.
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that whether section 3-807 of the Code may be satisfied based on testimony of an expert witness who has not personally examined the respondent presents a question of statutory construction which we review de novo.
In re O.C., 338 Ill. App. 3d 292, 788 N.E.2d 116, 273 Ill. Dec. 287 (4th Dist. 2003). The trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Involuntary commitment was against the manifest weight of the evidence because insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a reasonable likelihood of future harm.
In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec. 361 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). A finding by a circuit court that a person is subject to involuntary admission is given great deference and will not be set aside even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently. Determination should not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous.
In re Christopher P., 342 Ill. App. 3d 336, 795 N.E.2d 323, 276 Ill. Dec. 970 (5th Dist. 2003). On review, the circuit court’s factual findings are entitled to great deference because it stands in the best position to weight the credibility of all the witnesses. A circuit court’s decision is not manifestly erroneous unless the error is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.
In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 820 N.E.2d 424, 289 Ill. Dec. 648 (2004). Respondent raises constitutional questions concerning the construction and application of sections 2-107.1 and 3-804 of the Code. The standard of review for determining whether an individual's constitutional rights have been violated is de novo. We apply the same standard in matters of statutory construction.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). A trial court's decision to grant a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal without considering a potentially dispositive defense motion will not be reversed unless there was abuse of discretion.
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The original trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Found the trial court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
In re Alfred H. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). A trial court's decision in an involuntary-admission proceeding is given great deference and will not be set aside at the appellate level even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear-and-convincing standard, would have ruled differently, unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Alfred H. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 784, 832 N.E.2d 964, 295 Ill.Dec. 514 (4th Dist. 2005). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence. The original trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility of the testifying witnesses.
In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 781 N.E.2d 237, 269 Ill. Dec. 440 (2002). Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.
In re Cathy M., 326 Ill. App. 3d 335, 760 N.E.2d 579, 260 Ill. Dec. 162 (2nd Dist. 2001). Because the trial court's order for treatment was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court's order was reversed.
In re Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 751 N.E.2d 616, 256 Ill. Dec. 226 (4th Dist. 2001).In re Jones/In re Wheeler, 743 N.E.2d 1090 (5th Dist. 2001); In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 734 N.E.2d 13, 248 Ill. Dec. 305 (3rd Dist. 2000). Questions of statutory compliance are questions of law and will be reviewed on appeal
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000); In re Jakush, 311 Ill. App. 3d 940, 725 N.E.2d 785, 244 Ill. Dec. 312 (4th Dist. 2000); In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 667 N.E.2d 720 (2nd Dist. 1996); In re Tuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d 106, 644 N.E.2d 56, 205 Ill. Dec. 840 (2d Dist. 1994); In re Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 633 N.E.2d 169, 198 Ill. Dec. 707 (2nd Dist. 1994); In re Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d 605, 627 N.E.2d 410, 194 Ill. Dec. 294 (2d Dist. 1994). The trial court's finding that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission will not be reversed on appeal unless the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 730 N.E.2d 591, 246 Ill. Dec. 566 (1st Dist. 2000). The trial court's finding that in-patient hospitalization was the least restrictive, appropriate treatment setting for the respondent will not be reversed on appeal unless the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Moore, 301 Ill. App. 3d 759, 704 N.E.2d 442, 235 Ill. Dec. 93 (4th Dist. 1999). Appealing the order for his involuntary admission, the respondent argued that, in violation of Section 3-610, he had not been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of his admission. The Court reviewed this question of law de novo. However, the Court rejected the de novo standard when determining whether the State had proved that the respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm and, instead, used the manifest weight of the
In re Barry B., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 693 N.E.2d 882, 230 Ill. Dec. 404 (2nd Dist. 1998); In re Dorothy W., 295 Ill. App. 3d 107, 692, N.E.2d 388, 229 Ill. Dec. 615 (2nd Dist. 1998); In re Bontrager, 286 Ill. App. 3d 226, 676 N.E.2d 4, 221 Ill. Dec. 664 (3rd Dist. 1996). Rejecting the de novo standard, the Court found that the trial court's order
In re M.A., 293 Ill. App. 3d 995, 689 N.E.2d 138, 228 Ill. Dec. 266 (1st Dist. 1998). Using the de novo standard of review, the Court determined that the trial court improperly denied the respondent her statutory right to a jury trial.
V(F). APPEALS: Remedy
In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). Any noncompliance with the statutorily prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgment entered in such a case erroneous and of no effect.
In re Nancy A. , 342 Ill. App. 3d 355, 795 N.E.2d 377, 277 Ill. Dec. 10 (5th Dist. 2003). Failure to comply with the notice and filing requirements justifies a dismissal of a petition.
In re Christopher P., 342 Ill. App. 3d 336, 795 N.E.2d 323, 276 Ill. Dec. 970 (5th Dist. 2003). Failure to comply with procedural rules requires the reversal of court orders.
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555, 234 Ill. Dec. 215 (1998). The trial court proceedings having concluded, and the trial court's order having been reversed, remand to the trial court was not an appropriate remedy.
In re Katz, 267 Ill. App. 3d 692, 642 N.E.2d 893, 205 111. Dec. 28 (3d Dist. 1994). Katz filed a Petition for Discharge which was rejected; she was discharged approximately two months thereafter. The case was reversed on appeal for failure to provide for an independent evaluation which had been requested. However, the reviewing court also found that the trial court's finding that a prima facie case had been presented was not erroneous--therefore it could not be held that she was entitled to discharge. Because of discharge a new hearing would be an empty exercise, and, rejecting mootness as grounds for dismissing the appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order and remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the now-pending Petition for Discharge as moot. "In that way, any collateral consequences of the court's denial of the petition for discharge will be eliminated. Respondent will have spent an additional period in commitment, which might not have been necessary, but that is a direct, and not a collateral, consequence of the court's order. No way exists to restore that time to respondent, but she will be the same position as if no petition for discharge had been filed."
In re Walters, 183 Ill. App. 3d 452, 539 N.E.2d 454 (3d Dist. 1989). Reversal is a "hollow victory" for respondent since discharged and recommitted since hearing in question. Remand would be pointless. "Until the legislature chooses to fashion appropriate sanctions for statutory abuses in this area, we can only hope to send a message of our disapproval to the legal and legislative communities." 103 Ill. App. 3d at 455-56. See also, In re Riviere, 183 Ill. App. 3d 456, 539 N.E.2d 451 (3d Dist. 1989).
In re Smoots, 189 Ill. App. 3d 289, 544 N.E.2d 1235 (4th Dist. 1989). "Although there is no prejudice to the respondent in this case, those responsible for implementation of the [MHDD] Code...should not give that Code token recognition, but should follow the provisions and tenets of the Code which is to protect the rights of persons such as respondent." No dispositional report of record but indication that one had been prepared.
In re Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 708, 489 N.E.2d 347 (3d Dist. 1986). Reversal called for due to denial of request for independent examiner. Remand would be pointless given expiration of initial period of hospitalization and pendency of another petition. "We want to state clearly that we believe the lengthy delay in bringing this case to trial was a serious abuse of Williams' rights. The circuit court simply disregarded the statutory mandate that involuntary commitment hearings involving a person's liberty must be heard within 20 days. A special jury could have been called in order to give Williams a trial much sooner than was possible under the regular procedures."
V(G). APPEALS: Procedure
In re Tammy D. , 339 Ill. App. 3d 419, 790 N.E.2d 410, 274 Ill. Dec. 34 (5th Dist. 2003). Mental health proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. The public policy of Illinois favors settlements in civil cases and settlements, once made, should be final. A settlement agreement is typically not subject to appellate review. [also see 405 ILCS 5/6-100]
In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 801 N.E.2d 565, 279 Ill. Dec. 891 (1st Dist. 2003). The State’s motion to dismiss the first petition was granted. The court then, in an ex parte hearing, ordered the respondent’s detention and further psychiatric evaluation. A new petition was filed the next day. The court found that the second petition was a new cause of action and acted well within its discretion to allow the State a 15-day continuance in the second case.
Eertmoed v. City of Pekin, 83 Ill. App. 3d 362, 404 N.E.2d 942, 39 Ill. Dec. 351 (3rd Dist. 1980); Marcus v. Green, 13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (5th Dist. 1973). Since State failed to present a responsive argument addressing an asserted ground for reversal, it conceded the point.
Neal v. Board of Education, 56 Ill. App. 3d 10, 371 N.E.2d 869, 13 Ill. Dec. 777 (5th Dist. 1977). Party’s failure to respond to opponent’s argument for reversal is a confession of error as to that ground.
In re Schaap (2d Dist. 1995), 274 Ill. App. 3d 479, 654 N.E.2d 1084, 211 Ill. Dec. 274. Reviewing court entitled to rely on secondary authority in absence of controlling primary authority. State's motion to strike those portions of respondent's brief relying on Physician's Desk Reference, Manual of Clinical Pharmacology and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual denied; cited works are "trustworthy scholarly authorities that may properly be considered in interpreting evidence.
In re Weimer (2d Dist. 1991), 219 I11. App. 3d 1005, 162 Ill. Dec. 556, 580 N.E.2d 182. State's attempt to supplement record on appeal with evidence of voluntary respondent's written request for discharge rejected. "[P]ermitting the State to provide on appeal evidence which was needed to render the trial court's commitment order valid would have the effect of eroding the procedural protections afforded mental health respondents.
In re Johnson (1st Dist. 1981), 102 I11. App. 3d 1005, 58 I11. Dec. 23, 429 N.E.2d 1363. Once notice of appeal is filed, trial court is restrained from entering any order which would change or modify the judgment or its scope, and from entering any order which would have the effect of interfering with review of the judgment.
In re Houlihan (2d Dist. 1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 677, 172 Ill. Dec. 910, 596 N.E.2d 189. Portions of State's brief arguing propriety of dismissal of initial petition, in response to argument concerning subsequent petition, stricken where State could have but did not appeal dismissal.
In re Guzik (2d Dist. 1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 95, 617 N.E.2d 1322, 187 Ill. Dec. 601. Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction where respondent found in need of involuntary admission on October 25, 1991 but court continued matter until November 22, 1991 for presentation of disposition report and treatment plan, and notice of appeal filed on November 1, 1991. Final order was entered on November 22, and no notice of appeal perfected from that order. "While this court does not condone impermissible delays in civil commitment proceedings, the Code appears silent regarding any specific remedy for delays caused by unwarranted continuances, and this court would be reluctant to create a remedy in the absence of deliberate or egregious conduct by the State which deprived respondent of her rights.
In re McQueen, 145 Ill. App. 3d 148, 495 N.E.2d 128 (4th Dist. 1986). Where record supported involuntary admission and all statutory requirements appear to have been met, no justiciable issues or meritorious grounds for appeal existed, and appellate counsel would be allowed to withdraw pursuant to procedures by which counsel may seek withdrawal from frivolous appeals.