Skip to main content



VI(A) MISCELLANEOUS: Statutory Construction

In re Denise C., 348 Ill. App. 3d 889, 810 N.E.2d 654, 284 Ill. Dec. 864 (1st Dist. 2004). A petition not listing required familial information is fatally defective under the MHDD Code. However, a petition for involuntary commitment should be read in its entirety, and it is sufficient to provide information required by the Code somewhere in the petition.

In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that in revisiting the Code’s requirements, the legislature has made no revisions to section 3-807. We therefore presume that it has acquiesced in our construction of the law. For us to change course now would be tantamount to an amendment of the statute itself.

In re Christopher P., 342 Ill. App. 3d 336, 795 N.E.2d 323, 276 Ill. Dec. 970 (5th Dist. 2003). Procedural safeguards are construed strictly in favor of the respondent.

In re Evelyn S., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 788 N.E.2d 310, 273 Ill. Dec. 1 (5th Dist. 2003). The Mental Health Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 work together to govern the treatment and conditions of confinement of defendants found unfit to stand trial. If there is a conflict between the two codes, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure take precedence.

In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec. 395 (4th Dist. 2003) Ordinarily a court may not depart from a statute’s plain meaning by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions. However, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause that would defeat the obvious legislative intent and spirit. In such a case, the court may disregard, modify, or supply language to give effect to the legislative design, citing with approval In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 776 N.E.2d 218, 267 Ill. Dec. 81 (2002).

In re Robert R., 338 Ill. App 3d 343, 788 N.E.2d 122, 272 Ill. Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 2003). When applying a statute originally enacted to apply to an involuntary commitment proceeding to an involuntary treatment proceeding would cause inconvenience, involve a useless exercise, and work an absurd inconvenience on the proceedings, the statutory language may be ignored.

People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 751 N.E.2d 1104, 256 Ill. Dec. 267 (2001); Boaden v. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 664 N.E.2d 61, 215 Ill. Dec. 664, (1996). People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 733 N.E.2d 1235, 248 Ill. Dec. 237 (2000); People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 613 N.E.2d 740, 184 Ill. Dec. 423 (1993). In interpreting a statute, the objective of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should generally apply the statute without further aids to statutory construction.

People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 206 Ill. Dec. 94 (1994). Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law.

People v. Palmer (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 70, 170 Ill. Dec. 260, 592 N.E.2d 940. While "court may not read limitations into statute which legislature has not enacted, nor may it, by subtle construction, alter the plain meaning of the words employed...neither may a court read a limitation, which the legislature has seen fit to enact, out of a statute, by subtle construction or otherwise." 148 Ill. 2d at 85.

In re Petition of the Village of Kildeer (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 533, 125 Ill. Dec. 333, 530 N.E.2d 491. It is axiomatic that a party cannot circumvent the purpose of a statute by doing indirectly what he cannot do directly.

Harvel v. City of Johnston City (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 277, 166 Ill. Dec. 888, 586 N.E.2d 1217. A situation which is within the object, spirit and meaning of a statute is regarded as within the statute, even though it may not fall within the letter.

Grove School v. Dept. of Public Health (Ist Dist. 1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 937, 112 Ill. Dec. 364, 513 N.E.2d 973. Although generally regarded as mandatory, "shall" can be construed as directory depending upon legislative purpose. Proper interpretation of statute can't be based only on its language, but must also include the nature, object and consequences of construing it one way or the other.

Cooper v. Dept. of Children & Family Services (4th Dist. 1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 474, 174 Ill. Dec. 753, 599 N.E.2d 537. Where statute does not provide sanctions for failure to comply with provision in dispute, the requirement in the statute may be interpreted as being merely directory. If a provision of a statute makes the time for performance of an official duty without any language denying performance after a specified time, it is directory. If the time period is provided to safeguard someone's rights, it is mandatory and the agency cannot perform its official duty after the time requirement has passed.

People ex rel. Mayfield v. City of Springfield (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 609, 158 N.E.2d 582. When a statute employs a word having a well known legal significance the courts will assume that the legislature intended it to have that significance, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.

Heimgaertner v. Benj Manufacturing Company (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691. Legislature can ratify a judicial opinion by its passive acquiescence with the judicial construction.

Demchuk v. Duplacich (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112. A judicial construction of a statute, when ratified by the legislature, becomes a part of the statute. A court's subsequent failure to follow this construction is the equivalent of a prohibited amendment of the statute.

Berlin v. Nathan (1st Dist. 1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 21 Ill. Dec. 682. "If a statute is enacted which covers an area formerly covered by common law, such statute must be construed as adopting common law unless there is clear and specific language showing that change in the common law was intended by the legislature." 64 Ill. App. 3d at 956.

People v. Johnson (2d Dist. 1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 172 Ill. Dec. 711. "Definitions of terms within a legislative enactment will be sustained to the exclusion of hypothetical indulgences." 172 Ill. Dec. at 717.

People v. Singleton, 103 Ill.2d 339, 469 N.E.2d 200 (1984); People v. Tarlton, 91 Ill.2d 1, 434 N.E.2d 1110 (1982); In re Valentine, 201 Ill.App.3d 10, 558 N.E.2d 807 (5th Dist.1990). Statutes must be interpreted in a meaningful manner and not in such a way as to render them meaningless or a nullity.

In re Williams, 151 Ill.App.3d 911, 503 N.E.2d 816 (2d Dist.1987). Statutes governing the right to jury trial are to be liberally construed in favor of granting the right, both as to form and timeliness.

Spring Hill Cemetery v. Ryan, 20 Ill.2d 608, 170 N.E.2d 619 (1960). Statutes in para materia, even if enacted at different times, are to be construed together as though they were one statute.

People v. Maya, 105 Ill.2d 281, 473 N.E.2d 1287 (1985). Because statutes in para materia relate to the same subject, the courts are to presume that the legislature intended the two statutes to be consistent and harmonious, and all of their provisions are to be given full effect. Winston v. Mitchell, 53 Ill.App.3d 206, 368 N.E.2d 460 (1st Dist.1977) It is a maxim of statutory construction that the specific controls over the general.

In re Elkow, 167 Ill.App.3d 187, 521 N.E.2d 290 (4th Dist.1988). "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature's intent."

People v. Cochran, 167 Ill.App.3d 830, 522 N.E.2d 261 (5th Dist.1988). In construing statute, court looks first to words employed by the legislature, and may not alter their plain meaning or read into them limitations that do not exist.

Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port Authority, 123 Ill.2d 303, 527 N.E.2d 1264 (1988). Where two statutory constructions appear, one of which renders the statute absurd and illogical, and one of which renders the statute reasonable and sensible, the latter construction applies.

Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill.2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374 (1986). Court will presume that legislature did not intend inconvenience, injustice or absurdity in enacting statute. Court is to determine objective of statute and evil it desired to remedy by examining the entire statute. Court's duty to construe acts of legislature in manner that affirms constitutionality and validity.

Casteneda v. Ill. Human Rights Comm., 132 Ill.2d 304, 547 N.E.2d 437 (1989). In determining legislative intent, court should examine the entire statute, in all its parts and in connection with each other, to discern the legislative purpose.

Stryker v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 74 Ill.2d 507, 386 N.E.2d 36 (1978). If legislature does not amend a statute once a court has rendered an interpretation thereof, it is presumed that the legislature approves of the court's construction.

In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill.2d 545, 131 N.E.2d 487 (1956). The enumeration of certain items or courses of action in a statute assumes exclusion of all other items and courses of action not mentioned (expressio unius exclusio alterius).

In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.App.3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1st Dist.1975). Question of constitutionality of statute waived where not raised in trial court.

Statute is so vague as to violate due process when men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Statute need not be more specific than possible under the circumstances, however.

Miller v. Ill. Dept. of Public Aid, 94 Ill.App.3d 11, 418 N.E.2d 178 (1st Dist.1981). In artfully drawn or unwise social legislation will not be invalidated as violate of equal protection if classification has some reasonable basis; where any plausible reason for legislative action may be discerned, court's inquiry ends. Whether those reasons actually underlie the legislative action is constitutionally irrelevant.

O'Connor v. A.&P. Enterprises, 81 Ill.2d 260, 408 N.E.2d 204 (1980). Statute is presumed constitutional and reasonable doubts concerning its validity must be resolved in favor of the statute.

A material amendment to a statute is presumed to change it, but circumstances may indicate otherwise. Amendment of unambiguous statute normally indicates intent to change the law. Amendment is appropriate source of discerning legislative intent.

People v. Colclasure, 200 Ill.App.3d 1038, 558 N.E.2d 705 (5th Dist.1990). Legislature may enact laws complementing judicial authority but may not exercise judicial powers, and where statute conflicts with S.Ct. Rule, rule prevails over statute.

Board of Educ. of Township High School v. Cronin, 69 Ill.App.3d 472, 388 N.E.2d 72 (1st Dist.1979). Statutory language which is certain and unambiguous must be enforced as enacted.

VI(B). MISCELLANEOUS: Administrative Agencies/Procedure

Chiakulas v. DMHDD, Ill. App. 3d , 181 Ill. Dec. 41, 608 N.E.2d 114 (1st Dist. 1992). Mental health patient seeking review of DMHDD decision that he should be transferred from Elgin MHCC to Chester MHC was required to name Director of DMHDD as party when bringing complaint in circuit court for review of administrative decision.

Dixon Ass'n. for Retarded Citizens v. Thompson, 91 Ill.2d 518, 440 N.E.2d 117 (1982). It is within realm of judicial authority to assure that action of members of executive branch do not deprive developmental disabilities facility residents of statutory or constitutional rights, but court may not substitute its idea of what is best for residents.

Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977). Party need not exhaust administrative remedies where statute or administrative rule is attacked on its face.

When legislature vests discretionary authority in an administrative officer, intelligible standards must be provided to guide officer in the exercise of discretion.

Cotovsky v. Dept. of Registration and Education, 110 Ill.App.3d 417, 442 N.E.2d 520 (1st Dist.1982). Rule that issue not raised before administrative agency may not be raised on judicial review of agency order is not absolute.

Courts will not interfere with discretionary authority vested in administrative body unless authority is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or against manifest weight of evidence.

Miller v. Ill. Dept. of Public Aid, 94 Ill.App.3d 11, 418 N.E.2d 178 (1st Dist.1981). Wide latitude is granted to administrative agencies to exercise discretion in adopting rules and regulations necessary to carrying out spirit and purpose of legislation. Where agency does not act in excess of granted authority, it will not be overturned by reviewing court because the agency decision is thought unwise or the policy inappropriate.

Russell v. Dept. of Central Mgt. Svcs., 196 Ill.App.3d 641, 554 N.E.2d 464 (1st Dist.1990). While reviewing courts must defer to agency's interpretation of its own rules when reviewing administrative decisions unless the interpretation is unreasonable, courts do exercise independent review over an agency decision which interprets statutory law. Courts also review as a matter of law the legal effect of facts not in dispute.

VI(C). MISCELLANEOUS: Treatment and Institutional Issues

In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 803 N.E.2d 1067, 281 Ill. Dec. 446 (2d Dist. 2004). Because involuntary admission proceedings pose a grave threat to an individual’s liberty interests, the Code’s procedural safeguards should be narrowly construed.

In re Linda W., 349 Ill. App. 3d 437, 812 N.E.2d 49, 285 Ill. Dec. 460 (5th Dist. 2004). Because involuntary admission proceedings pose a grave threat to an individual’s liberty interests, the Code’s procedural safeguards should be strictly construed in favor of the respondent.

In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987, 283 Ill. Dec. 699 (2004). In this case, the court found that because involuntary administration of mental health services implicates fundamental liberty interests, statutes governing the applicable procedures should be construed narrowly.

In re Tyrone S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 495, 791 N.E.2d 157, 274 Ill. Dec. 361 (1st Dist. 2003), appeal denied by 205 Ill. 2d 584, 803 N.E.2d 483, 281 Ill. Dec. 79 (2003). Involuntary admission implicates substantial liberty interests of a person, these interests must be balanced against the need to provide care for those unable to care for themselves and the need to protect society from the dangerously mentally ill.

In re M.A., 356 Ill. App. 3d 733, 826 N.E.2d 1071, 292 Ill. Dec. 635 (1st Dist. 2005). Involuntary admission procedures implicate substantial liberty interests . . . that must be balanced against the dual objectives of involuntary admissions generally, which are to provide care for those who are unable to care for themselves, and to protect society from the dangerously mentally ill. (citing In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 130-32, 601 N.E.2d 712)

In re Robert R., 338 Ill. App 3d 343, 788 N.E.2d 122, 272 Ill. Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 2003). Section 2-107.1 (authorized involuntary treatment) serves as a guide for balancing the liberty of the individual and the State’s interest in treating its mentally ill citizens.

Jinkins v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 377, 783 N.E.2d 123, 270 Ill. Dec. 548 (1st Dist. 2003) Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant medical hospital in a medical negligence and EMTALA action and plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff claimed that defendant, who transferred husband to a state hospital, was liable for her husband’s suicide that occurred one hour after husband was released from the state hospital. Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment on medical negligence and EMTALA claims because plaintiff failed to show defendant’s action was the proximate cause of her husband’s death.

Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F.Supp. 63 (D.C.Colo.1970). Only legitimate purpose of holding one for inpatient commitment in a mental health facility is treatment, not incarceration.

People v. Sansone, 18 Ill.App.3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist.1974); In re Collins, 102 Ill.App.3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531 (4th Dist.1981); In re James, 191 Ill.App.3d 352, 547 N.E.2d 759 (4th Dist.1989). Inherent in the civil commitment process is the state's promise that the individual subject to admission will receive treatment.

Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S.Ct 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982); In re Orr, 176 Ill. App.3d 498, 531 N.E. 2d 64 (4th Dist.1988). Even during hospitalization, individual retains liberty interest in remaining free of unwarranted intrusions into body and mind.

U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.1987); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.1984); In re Orr, 176 Ill.App.3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64 (4th Dist.1988). Informed consent and the right to refuse medical treatment are concepts grounded in the common law right to be free from non-consensual bodily invasions, the individual's liberty interest in personal autonomy and bodily integrity, and the right to privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution.

In re Orr, 176 Ill.App.3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64 (4th Dist.1988). Doctrine of informed consent imposes duty on physician to inform patient of risks involved in particular treatment or surgical procedure.

Physician's testimony of medical need insufficient to justify forced medication where no discussion or consideration of available less intrusive treatments, risk to patient, emergency situation or duration of forced medication need. Evidence suggested medication as behavioral control rather than response to threat of imminent harm to patient or public.

Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D.Pa.1977). Fundamental rights are implicated when state commits individual to a facility more restrictive than other state facilities to which individual could be sent.

Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C.Cir.1969). "The principle of least restrictive alternative consistent with the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature of a civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty...A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in order to avoid deprivation of liberty without due process of law." 419 F.2d at 623.

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). When state acts to limit personal liberty, it can only do so in the least restrictive manner possible.

In re Schouler, 106 Wash.2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (Wash.1986). Trial court abused discretion, in electro-convulsive therapy hearing, in denying continuance, where involuntary patient's attorney had at most 24 hours to prepare and had no access to medical records, opportunity to consult with patient's family or select own expert, or time to talk to either of state's experts.

Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa App.1982). Evidence supported trial court's finding that state hospital violated industry standards by prescribing various major tranquilizers for mentally retarded plaintiff resulting in diagnosis of tardive dyskinesia. Record devoid of evidence of aggressive behavior or self-abuse sufficient to justify extent to which drugs used, no regular exams, no drug holidays, no outside consultations, poly-pharmacy and use of restraints for convenience, and lack of informed consent all justified court's award.

Clark v. Cohen, 613 F.Supp. 684 (D.C.Pa.1985). Mental health facility resident denied substantive and due process rights where treatment reviews consistently recommended removal from institution and placement in community living arrangement but transfer had never taken place, presumably the result of some agency's failure to see fit to allocate sufficient funds to secure community living arrangement for her.

Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F.Supp. 713 (N.D.Ill.1978); In re Orr, 176 Ill.App.3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64 (4th Dist.1988). Physician who intentionally performs non-emergency treatment upon his patient without his consent may be liable for battery.

In re E.G., 133 Ill.2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989). Mature minor, like an adult, has common law right to refuse treatment, even if it is of a life-sustaining nature. State's parens patriae power over minors is strongest when minor is immature and thus incompetent to make decisions, but the authority fades as minor gets older.

In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989). The common law right to withhold consent for treatment and thus refuse treatment includes, under appropriate circumstances, artificial nutrition and hydration.

Gooden v. Howard Co., Md., 917 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir.1990). Although state confinement of a mentally ill person is generally analyzed under the 14th Amendment's due process clause, there is also a distinct right to be free from unreasonable government seizure of the person for whatever reason under the 4th Amendment. Thus summary judgment was reversed in action against police officers for seizing plaintiff from her apartment and taking her to hospital for psychiatric evaluation where genuine issues of fact existed concerning whether officers had reasonable belief that seizure was lawful, i.e., probable cause for the belief that she was mentally ill and likely to be a danger to herself or others as a result thereof.

VI(D). MISCELLANEOUS: Confidentiality

McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2004). Psychologist who performed "fitness for duty" examination of village police officer was "therapist" within meaning of Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, and report issued by psychologist who performed "fitness for duty" examination of village police officer was record covered by Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, which generally prohibits disclosure of mental health records and communications.
The Confidentiality Act contains no disclosure exception for police departments performing mental health examinations to determine fitness for duty. The Confidentiality Act does allow for disclosure on consent, however the consent form was not limited in purpose as required under the Act. 740 ILCS 110/5. The court distinguished its facts from Sangirardi v. Vill. of Stickney , 342 Ill. App. 3d 1, 793 N.E.2d 787, 276 Ill. Dec. 28 (1st Dist. 2003).

Sangirardi v. Vill. of Stickney , 342 Ill. App. 3d 1, 793 N.E.2d 787, 276 Ill. Dec. 28 (1st Dist. 2003). Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, which generally provides patients with right to confidentiality as to medical records, did not excuse village police officer from disclosing to village police chief examining psychologist's ultimate recommendation regarding officer's fitness for duty. Village police chief had authority, under state law, to order village police officer to submit to a fitness exam regarding his mental health.

Chand v. Patla , 342 Ill. App. 3d 655, 795 N.E.2d 403, 277 Ill. Dec. 36 (5th Dist. 2003). Appeal denied by 206 Ill. 2d 619, 806 N.E.2d 1065, 282 Ill. Dec. 477 (2003). Anyone seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information faces a formidable challenge and must show that disclosure is authorized by the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act. When conducting a peer review of the services being provided by a physician under the medical assistance program, the Department of Public Aid, who is seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information, is required under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act to limit its request to records or communications essential for the purpose for which the disclosure is made and to inform the recipient that such disclosure might be made. 740 ILCS 110/9.

Jaffee v. Redmond (7th Cir. 1995)51 F. 3d 1346, cert, granted 1996 U.S. LEXIS 737, No. 95-266. Existence of psychotherapist/patient privilege recognized under F. R. Evid. 501 as matter of first impression. Therapist (here a social worker) and patient have unique relationship and patient's ability to communicate freely and without fear of disclosure is a key to successful treatment. Such communications often involve highly personal matters, disclosure of which would frequently be embarrassing to point of mortification for patient. (Court noted that all 50 states have recognized need for, and have adopted varying forms of, psychotherapist/patient privilege.)

Renzi v. Morrison (1st Dist. 1993), k18 N.E.2d 794, 188 Ill. Dec. 224. Psychiatrist who voluntarily disclosed patient's confidential communications, as witness for spouse in divorce proceeding, could be held liable for damages. Common law witness privilege limited by MHDD Confidentiality Act. Psychiatrist's testimony "tipped...balance" in decision to award temporary custody to spouse.

Novak v. Rathnam, 106 Ill.2d 478, 478 N.E.2d 1334 (1985). Prior disclosure by treating psychiatrist and psychologist of privileged information at homicide trial constituted waiver of therapist's rights and obligations under MHDD Confidentiality Act to assert testimonial privilege in subsequent wrongful death action against defendant and therapists for alleged breach of duty to public and victim by failing to protect from injury in releasing defendant from mental health facility.

Waiver of privilege through one physician is a waiver as to another physician who jointly treated patient for same condition.

In re Marriage of Lombaer, 200 Ill.App.3d 712, 558 N.E.2d 388 (1st Dist.1990). Where wife in dissolution proceedings had not in any way raised mental condition, trial court did not comply with MHDD Confidentiality Act requirements and erred in ordering psychiatrist's discovery deposition and hospital records turned over to husband, even though physician-patient relationship had been terminated.

In re Marriage of Semmler, 90 Ill.App.3d 649, 413 N.E.2d 502 (2d Dist.1980); Martino v. Family Service Agency, 112 Ill.App.3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6 (4th Dist.1982). Communications made to family therapist pursuant to family counseling are confidential communications under the MHDD Confidentiality Act.

House v. Swedish American Hosp., 206 Ill.App.3d 437, 564 N.E.2d 922 (2d Dist.1990). Trial court erred in issuing a protective order preventing plaintiff from contacting, deposing or revealing name of another resident of hospital whom plaintiff alleged was carelessly and negligently allowed to inflict injuries on her in defendant hospital. Par. 10(b) did not prohibit plaintiff's requests where, court reasoned, patient was not a recipient of mental health services at the time of the injury, and that deposition would not necessarily reveal confidential information. Ch.91 1/2, par. 810(b).

Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College, 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 501 N.E.2d 1380 (4th Dist.1986). Where counselor held self out as psychologist and student was sent to counselor by school, and counselor later revealed information received during sessions, conduct sufficient to allege cause of action under MHDD Confidentiality Act.

Act prohibits redisclosure by one to whom disclosure has been made, even if consent to first disclosure.

Ehredt v. Forest Hosp., Inc., 142 Ill.App.3d 1009, 492 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist.1986). Trial court's finding that hospital was entitled to protective order supported its conclusion that hospital did not violate MHDD Confidentiality Act by refusing former patient access to her social history until it could be determined whether disclosure would affect confidentiality, privacy and safety of patient or third parties.

People v. Sagstetter, 177 Ill.App.3d 982, 532 N.E.2d 1029 (2d Dist.1988). Where defendant pled guilty to charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, he did not make his mental condition a defense by agreeing to receive counseling for his mental problems, and statements made to therapist were confidential and could not be admitted at sentencing hearing.


Muellner v. Blessing Hosp., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 782 N.E.2d 799, 270 Ill. Dec. 240 (2002). The behavioral care unit of a skilled nursing facility is a "licensed private hospital" as defined in the Mental Health Code because it is licensed by the Department of Public Health and it provides treatment to persons with mental illness. As a result, the behavioral care unit is a "mental health facility" as defined in the Code, and a guardian can admit a ward there only by complying with the admission provisions of the Code.

In re Austwick (1st Dist. 1995), 275 Ill. App. 3d 665, 656 N.E.2d 773, 212 Ill. Dec. 176. Neither lack of capacity nor qualifying condition sufficiently demonstrated to grant surrogate decision maker (guardian) authority to forgo life-sustaining treatment pursuant to terms of Health Care Surrogate Act, thus trial court's removal of DNR order from medical chart was appropriate.

Neither guardian's misinterpretation of HCSA to effect that he could consent to DNR, nor guardian's authorization of psychotropic medications (pre-Austin) were other than well-intentioned, and trial court's denial of petition to remove guardian for good cause was not against manifest weight of evidence.

In re Austwick (1st Dist. 1995), 275 Ill. App. 3d 769, 656 N.E.2d 779, 212 Ill. Dec. 182. Reading 405 ILCS 5/2-110 with 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1, legislative intent is to require guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ward lacks capacity to make a reasoned decision about ECT, just as medication, given intrusive nature and potential side effects of each type of treatment. How this shall be proven is not indicated in the statute; however, in this case the trial court's determination that ward lacked such capacity, based on testimony of psychiatrist requesting ECT for ward, is not manifestly erroneous.

Substituted judgment standard is applicable under rationale of C.E., but neither party presented any evidence on this issue, therefore best interest standard was applicable.

Trial court's determination that ECT was in ward's best interest was manifestly erroneous given contradictory testimony of psychiatrist about possible medications with fewer risks than ECT.

Anderson & Equip for Equality v. Schlosser (3d Dist. 1994), 267 Ill. App. 3d 351, 642 N.E.2d 194, 204 Ill. Dec. 732. Equip for Equality sought petition for Order of protection on behalf of disabled adult pursuant to allegations of sexual abuse by uncle, son of her guardian, in guardian's home. Domestic Abuse Act allows disabled adult or another on her behalf to seek Order of protection; to allow guardian to control disabled adult's access to court, particularly where alleged abuser is close relative of guardian, would contradict clear purposes of Act.

In re Estate of Ohlman (1st Dist. 1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 120, 630 N.E.2d 1133, 197 Ill. Dec. 9. 755 ILCS 5/11a-10(a) does not permit waiver of GAL by court, although appointing an attorney for respondent but no GAL is permissible, assuming determination that attorney can provide necessary protections and help court arrive at informed decision. But where respondent asked to proceed pro se the two roles were conflicting, and appointment of attorney no longer met statutory requirement for appointment of GAL. Error requires reversal of trial court's order appointing OSG.

In re Guardianship of Austin(4th Dist, 1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 816, 185 Ill. Dec. 861, 615 N.E.2d 420. "[T]he plain meaning of section 2-107. 1 (g) requires a petition, hearing, and court order before a guardian can authorize the administration of psychotropic medication--even if the ward does not refuse consent. " Trial court did not abuse discretion by limiting placement options of guardian or appointing as guardian of estate despite public-benefits-only income.

In re C.E. , 161 Ill. 2d 200, 641 N.E.2d 345, 204 Ill. Dec. 121 (1994). Court's role under par. 2-107.1 does not constitute intrusion into therapeutic decision making or guardian's appropriate exercise of substitute decision making authority, but merely provides court's oversight of guardian's decision making to ensure compliance with statutory protections of 2-107. 1. Citing In re Guardianship of Austin (4th Dist. 1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1050.

In re M.M., et al. (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702, 189 Ill. Dec. 1. Juvenile court lacks authority to place conditions on the power of court-appointed guardians to consent to adoptions.

In re Estate of Nelson 4th Dist. 1993), Ill. App. 3d , 190 Ill. Dec. 212, 621 N.E.2d 81. Trial court properly appointed g.a.l. to investigate report that disabled person was not receiving appropriate care; g.a.l. fees properly charged against estate. Trial court retains jurisdiction to supervise guardians, thus had jurisdiction to appoint g.a.l. at request of estate guardian.

In re Gardner, 121 Ill.App.3d 7, 459 N.E.2d 17 (4th Dist.1984). The only methods and procedures by which one may be admitted to a mental health facility are found in the MHDD Code. Par. 11a-17 of the Probate Act does not allow guardian to admit non consenting ward. Ch. 110 1/2, par. 11a-17.

In re Marriage of Drews, 115 Ill.2d 201, 503 N.E.2d 339 (1986). Authority accorded to guardian under par. 11a-17, to make provision for "support, care, comfort, health, education and maintenance and such professional services as are appropriate" and requirement to "assist the ward in the development of maximum self-reliance and independence" does not include authority to maintain or defend any legal proceeding and specifically does not include authority to initiate dissolution of marriage proceeding on behalf of ward. Guardian may seek declaration that marriage is void and should be annulled if ward lacked capacity to consent.

In re Sodini, 172 Ill.App.3d 1055, 527 N.E.2d 530 (4th Dist.1988). Jurisdictional defect where adult guardianship petitioner fails to give notice to relatives required by statute to be listed on petition, and to personally serve respondent.

In re Simpson Driskell v. Byrd, 197 Ill.App.3d 836, 555 N.E.2d 428 (4th Dist.1990). Guardian had 90 days from date of appointment to commence action to have marriage declared void for ward's lack of mental capacity.

Husband need not be able to transact ordinary business to be competent to marry, but must have ability to understand nature, obligations, effect and duties of marriage.

Stevenson v. Magna Bank, 200 Ill.App.3d 991, 558 N.E.2d 573 (5th Dist.1990). Trial court's guardianship determination won't be disturbed unless clear abuse of discretion or against manifest weight of evidence.

Who has custody of child is secondary to best interests and welfare in guardianship proceedings, intrusion on custodial parent's prerogatives notwithstanding, and appointment of bank for purposes of maintaining legal action on behalf of minor acceptable.

Probate Act allows appointment of guardian without a hearing by court on its own motion. 11-5(a).

In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989). Par. 11a-17 impliedly authorizes guardian to exercise right to refuse artificial sustenance on ward's behalf. Ward must be terminally ill (incurable, irreversible, imminent death), irreversibly comatose or persistent vegetative state as verified by attending physician and 2 other physicians. Guardian must obtain court order pursuant to this showing and clear and convincing evidence that ward's intent was to avoid the delay of death by artificial means.

In re Estate of Debevec, 195 Ill.App.3d 891, 552 N.E.2d 1043 (5th Dist.1990). Failure to provide notice to nearest living relatives in original guardianship proceeding is jurisdictional defect; no similar requirement for transferal of guardianship.

Removal of guardian for "other good cause" not limited to malfeasance/misfeasance. 23-2(a)(10).

For award of attorney fees to petitioner in challenge to a guardian, the legal services rendered must benefit the estate.

In re Estate of Stoica, 203 Ill.App.3d 225, 560 N.E.2d 1152 (1st Dist.1990). Trial court not authorized to order county to pay guardian ad litem fees where statute required that fees be paid by state, if respondent is unable to pay, despite legislature's failure to appropriate funds for such payment. 11a-10(c).


Litchfield Terrace v. Illinois Dept. of Public Health (3rd Dist. 1993), 252 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 191 Ill. Dec. 923, 624 N.E.2d 1301. Nursing Home Care Act and IDPH minimum standards impose dug of care on nursing facility for protection of resident. Duty breached when facility allowed chronic schizophrenic to sign out on 97 degree day and failed to notify anyone when he did not soon return. The recipient later expired after being located and hospitalized. IDPH hearing officer's findings of violation, reversed by circuit court, reinstated by appellate court.

Wills v. DeKalb Area Retirement Ctr., 175 Ill.App.3d 833, 530 N.E.2d 1066 (2d Dist.1988). Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979 allowed administratrix to recover punitive damages for injuries incurred prior to decedent's death, but did not expand Wrongful Death Act to include punitive damages for death, or cause of action for wrongful death. Entitlement to treble damages under NHCRA also precludes duplicate recovery of punitive damages under Survival Act. Ch. 111 1/2, par. 4151 et seq.

Starr v. Leininger, 198 Ill.App.3d 622, 556 N.E.2d 266 (3d Dist.1990). Par. 4153-601 of NHCRA does not render nursing home owner/operator liable for property damage, which was the result of employee theft of patient's ring, absent showing theft was in furtherance of business or home benefited.

VI(G). MISCELLANEOUS: Institutional Rights to IDEA

Jinkins v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 377, 783 N.E.2d 123, 270 Ill. Dec. 548 (1st Dist. 2003) Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant medical hospital in a medical negligence and EMTALA action and plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff claimed that defendant, who transferred husband to a state hospital, was liable for her husband’s suicide that occurred one hour after husband was released from the state hospital. Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment on medical negligence and EMTALA claims because plaintiff failed to show defendant’s action was the proximate cause of her husband’s death.

Neely v. Feinstein (9th Cir, 1995), 50 F.3d 1502. Hospital officials not entitled to qualified immunity for sexual abuse of psychiatric patient where charged employee had history of similar episodes yet was allowed further contact with female patients; officials demonstrated "conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence."

Brown v. Murphy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 981, 664 N.E.2d 186, 215 Ill. Dec. 789 (1st Dist. 1996). DMHDD failed to provide full information necessary to informed consent when seeking recipient authorization to serve as rep payee. DMHDD must include notice that benefits not subject to attachment or garnishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 407(a).

Presumption against incompetence in 2-101 is not a presumption of competence; DMHDD must therefore determine competence of recipient to give informed consent, not merely need for guardian.

In re Estate of Merritt (1st Dist. 1995), 272 Ill, App, 3d 1017, 651 N.E.2d 680, 209 Ill, Dec. 502. Section 407(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U,S,C, 407(a)) bars use of legal process to reach benefits and wide discretion to payee to use finds in beneficiary's best interests, not those of State.

Wilson v. Formigoni (N. D. Ill, 1993), 832 F. Supp. 1152. Though state is not usually duty-bound to protect citizens from third party acts of violence, a duty to protect does arise when a citizen is in state custody. Thus mental health patient could sue state for beating she suffered at hands of third party after she escaped from state facility. Analysis in qualified immunity cases: 1) whether alleged conduct violated plaintiff's constitutional rights; 2) if so, whether those constitutional rights were clearly established at time violation occurred.

Wilson's allegation that voluntary status was not entirely knowing, as in Zinermon, led to state's assertion that voluntary patients did not have the same constitutionally protected rights to reasonable conditions of care and safety as those involuntarily committed. As noted in Halderman v. Penhurst State School and Hospital (E.D. Pa. 1992), 784 F. Supp. 215, 222, aff'd. without opinion, 977 F. 2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992), while only some at hospital were involuntarily committed, all were essentially committed involuntarily because of the lack of a viable alternative. Here there is evidence of affirmative action, in form of coercion to volunteer, on part of state to facilitate retaining Wilson in custody.

Discussion of availability of cause of action for social worker malpractice and Illinois cases recognizing and rejecting it.

Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Board of Educ. (7th Cir. 1996), 79 F. 3d 654. IDEA's "stay-put" provision, which requires district to maintain current placement during pendency of any proceedings to enforce the act, does not require continuation of funding placement past 21st birthday.

Mary P. v. Illinois State Board of Educ. (N.úD. Ill. 1996), 919 F. Supp. 1173. Speech-impaired student entitled to services even though performing at age-appropriate educational level. Educational performance involves more than ability to meet academic criteria, where impairment severe enough to interfere with ability to communicate.

VI(H). MISCELLANEOUS: Parental Rights

In re E.J.F., 161 Ill.App.3d 325, 514 N.E.2d 544 (4th Dist.1987). Where record indicated lack of willingness to cooperate with DCFS, and expert testimony indicated past and current paranoid schizophrenia and inability to function as normal parent for next few years, showing for termination of parental rights sufficient.

In re Enis, 121 Ill.2d 124, 520 N.E.2d 362 (1988). Finding, for termination of parental rights, of failure to make reasonable efforts to change conditions which led to child becoming ward of court must be made on clear and convincing evidence.

Helvey v. Rednour, 86 Ill.App.3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (5th Dist.1980). Fundamental personal rights, including rights to marry, procreate, use contraceptives, undergo abortion, engage in family relationships and rear and educate children extend to all persons, including the mentally retarded.

In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill.2d 255, 562 N.E.2d 174 (1990). In hearing on petition to terminate parental rights, evidence regarding matters other than parental fitness is irrelevant.

Blakely v. Blakely, 72 Ill.App.3d 946, 391 N.E.2d 222 (4th Dist.1979). Termination of rights of natural parents to their children is as drastic and permanent an action as can be taken by a court.


In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 785 N.E.2d 46, 271 Ill. Dec. 395 (4th Dist. 2003). The clearly expressed intent of the General Assembly would be frustrated and injustice would result if, as a result of an out-of-state felony charge, the trial court were deprived of jurisdiction to involuntarily admit a person such as respondent. The State would have no power to protect its citizen from dangerously mentally ill persons and no authority to assert its significant parens patriae interest in providing for persons unable to care for themselves.

U.S. ex rel, Alvine v. Chester Mental Health Ctr., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17359, 2004 WL 1899997, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004). It has been well accepted that habeas corpus is the traditional remedy for challenging involuntary commitment in a mental institution.

Anderson v. Village of Forest Park, 238 Ill. App. 3d 83, 606 N.E.2d 205, 179 Ill. Dec. (1st Dist. 1992) Seizure and involuntary hospitalization by police officers and paramedics may give rise to constitutional claims under 4th Amendment which is not subject to state immunity provisions of mental health code or tort claims act.

Arthur v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 818, 692 N.E.2d 1238, 230 Ill. Dec. 72 (1st Dist. 1998) False imprisonment cause of action exists for a person involuntarily committed in violation of statutory time limit.

Sassali v. DeFauw, 297 Ill. App. 3d 50, 696 N.E.2d 1217, 231 Ill. Dec. 646 (2nd Dist. 1998) Initially authorized detention under the mental health code can become a false imprisonment when there is a failure to comply with a filing requirement for the commitment procedure.

Threlkeld v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Ill. 2001) Medical malpractice action against hospital and ER doctor exists under the Illinois Mental Health Code for medicating patient against her will when she posed no danger to herself or others.

In re Estate of Liebling, 118 Ill.App.2d 460, 254 N.E.2d 531 (2d Dist.1970). Where facts material to the issues are within the knowledge of a party and opportunity to disclose is afforded but not availed of, presumption arises that such evidence, if given, would have been unfavorable to the party.

In re Estate of Zarse, 174 Ill.App.3d 783, 529 N.E.2d 50 (4th Dist.1988). EAHCA preempted state law, preventing DMHDD from seeking recovery against guardianship estate of deceased minor who had received educational services from the state under EAHCA even though estate held large sums from medical malpractice settlement as a result of condition which handicapped child and required special ed. services.

AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. County of Cook, 136 Ill.2d 334, 555 N.E.2d 361 (1990). Under Ill. Freedom of Information Act, when agency has received proper request to inspect or copy public record, it must either comply or state why it cannot, and furnishing a record that does not conform to that requested forcing the requester to explain why it is inadequate is an insufficient response.

In re V.H. v. Morgan, 197 Ill.App.3d 52, 554 N.E.2d 686 (1st Dist.1990). Action against state officials which seeks to compel them to perform their duty is not suit against state, and payment of state funds may be compelled.

Children in state custody have constitutional right to minimally adequate care; they have right not to be subjected to multiple placements which may cause them emotional harm.

In re Marriage of Peoples, 96 Ill.App.3d 94, 420 N.E.2d 1072 (5th Dist.1981). Amended pleadings filed without leave of court should be stricken and disregarded on review.

People v. Evans, 412 Ill. 616, 107 N.E.2d 839 (1952). Pleadings of paupers shall be liberally construed.

Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 174 Ill.App.3d 1001, 529 N.E.2d 599 (1st Dist.1988). The mentally disabled, like minors, have always been favored persons in the eyes of the law.

Proehl v. Leadley, 86 Ill.App.2d 472, 230 N.E.2d 516 (3d Dist.1967). Even one merely alleged to be mentally disabled is entitled to the special protection of the court whenever his rights may be affected.

In re Valentine, 201 Ill.App.3d 10, 558 N.E.2d 807 (5th Dist.1990). Civil commitment proceedings, in some times and places, have been unfairly used as a "ruse, as a device to silence critics"; the legislature's "bright line" of timely examination or release is a "prophylactic against deciding these kinds of cases on an ad hoc basis."

In re Long, 203 Ill.App.3d 357, 561 N.E.2d 290 (2d Dist.1990). The civil commitment process used as a "tool to oppress".

Montague v. George J. Loudon Mem. Hosp., 73 Ill.App.3d 298, 396 N.E.2d 1289 (1st Dist.1979). Failure to release voluntary patient or cause petition to be filed within five days of request for discharge gave rise to civil action for damages for violation of statutory procedures.

Board of Educ. of Township High School v. Cronin, 69 Ill.App.3d 472, 388 N.E.2d 72 (1st Dist.1979). Suit based on claim that certain state officer violated statutory duty is not a suit against state over which court of claims would have exclusive jurisdiction.

In re Marriage of Henry (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 541, 622 N.E.2d 803, 190 Ill. Dec. 773. "...the legalisms and creative linguistics that were applied in this case to explain and justify what is presumably deemed to be an equitable result will have unforeseen and unfortunate results that will resound into the future. " 156 Ill. 2d at 553-553, 622 N.E.2d at 809-810, Heiple, J., dissenting.

Eckiss v. McVaigh (5th Dist. 1994), 261 Ill. App. 3d 778, 634 N.E.2d 476, 199 Ill. Dec. 637. Ancient legal principles, like guardianship, usually have generated many Supreme Court opinions addressing most issues. "After researching current cases and statutes, instead of concluding that there is no relevant Illinois statute or case on point a lawyer should not terminate working and simply rely upon cases from other jurisdictions. Rather, a lawyer must put aside the modern law books, turn off the computer, and dust off the old law books from the last century. " 199 Ill. Dec. at 640.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed 510. "The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relationship of the family--a relationship as old and fundamental as our entire civilization--surely does not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution." 381 U.S. at 495-496, Goldberg, J., concurring.

People v. Amaya (3d Dist. 1994), 255 Ill. App. 3d 967, 627 N.E.2d 753, 194 Ill. Dec. 416, 421, quoting United States v. Kojayan (9th Cir. 1993), 8 F. 3d 1315, 1323: "Prosecutors are subject to constraints and responsibilities that don't apply to other lawyers. (Citations) While lawyers representing private parties may--indeed must-do everything ethically permissible to advance their clients' interests, lawyers representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first. The prosecutor's job isn't just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules. (Citations) As Justice Douglas warned, 'It]he function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crimes a fair trial.' Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S.637, 648-649, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1874, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Amaya, prosecutor made closing argument to jury which encouraged jury to draw inferences based on a deliberate misrepresentation of facts known to the prosecution, breaching duty of fairness to defendant.

In re Lutrell (4th Dist. 1994), 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 633 N.E.2d 74, 198 Ill. Dec. 612. "We feel compelled to express our increasing dismay at the slipshod manner with which these cases are handled. The procedural safeguards enacted by the legislature are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are intended to safeguard the important liberty interests of the respondent which are involved in mental health cases. 633 N.E.2d at 81.

People v. Simpson (1st Dist. 1994), 268 Ill. App. 3d 305, 643 N.E.2d 1262, 205 Ill. Dec. 655. Victim's permanent physical disability combined with nature of relationship between her and defendant insurance agent was such that she was in a position of vulnerability and was easy prey for financial exploitation. Thus she falls within ambit of protection of 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3(a). Dissent would not find her unable to or incapable of preventing the offense when she suffered from post-polio sclerosis only.

McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance, Inc., 77 F.3d 540 (1st Cir. 1996). Involuntary civil commitment proceedings for dangerous persons suffering from mental illness are among those civil proceedings where 4th Amendment applies. Villanova v. Abrams (7th Cir. 1992), 972 F. 2d 792, 795-96. But city policy permitting forcible warrantless entry of private residence absent demonstrable exigent circumstances to enforce involuntary civil commitment order comes within "special needs" exception to 4th Amendment warrant requirement. (Forced entry and struggle resulted in death of respondent.)

Boyce v. Fernandes (7th Cir. 1996), 77 F.3d 946. "It is a common mistake to exaggerate the degree to which senile dementia renders an individual mentally incompetent." 77 F.3d at --. Police officer had probable cause to arrest Boyce for theft of auto from elderly woman from whom she had acquired power of attorney without knowledge of granddaughter. Woman was admitted to nursing home with bruises and lacerations, old clothes, confused; furniture and possessions removed from home. Boyce was released from jail and never prosecuted, and brought action against arresting officer.

Power of attorney: "The intimation that a power of attorney immunizes holder from a charge of conversion is nonsense. Fiduciary relationship creates opportunity for tortious if not criminal abuse of authority.

People v. Harris (1988), 123 Ill, 2d 113, 128, 122 I11. Dec. 76, 526 N.E.2d 335. "It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts..." regardless of locale."

Sidwell v. Griggsville Community School District (2d Dist. 1991), 208 111. App. 3d 296, 299-300, 152 Ill. Dec. 961, 566 N.E.2d 838. Illinois rule of stare decisis indicates circuit court should follow precedent. Of appellate court of its district; if such precedent does not exist, court should follow that of other districts; if a conflict between other districts, court may choose which precedent it considers most correct.

Crawford v. Regents of Univ. of California (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 278. False imprisonment and battery jury verdict for $52,000+ reinstated against university hospital for illegal detaining and medicating involuntary patient beyond time for release.

Janes v. Albergo (1st Dist. 1993), 254 Ill. App. 3d 951, 626 N. E. 2d 1127, 193 Ill. Dec. 576. Where State hospital physicians and treatment team staff were providing services in accordance with independent duty which arose out of the relationship with plaintiff as a patient and defendants as professional health care providers rather than as an obligation of State employment, neither sovereign immunity nor public official immunity supported dismissal of complaint for damages by the trial court.

People v. Adams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 331, 173 Ill. Dec. 600, 597 N.E. 2d 574. Protections afforded by the 4th Amendment are not limited to investigations of criminal conduct but may apply to governmental activities in civil context as well, 173 Ill, Dec. at 605.

First Midwest Bank/Danville v. Hogland (4th Dist. 1993), 244 Ill. App. 3d 596, 184 Ill. Dec. 250, 613 N.E.2d 277. Function of nunc pro tunc order is to speak now for what was done earlier; basis for order must have be found within the record, not merely upon recollection of trial judge or affidavits.

Once written order or docket entry becomes part of the court record, it cannot be removed from the record; nunc pro tunc order may correct but not mandate destruction of, revised portions of record.

Warren v. Warren (3rd Dist. 1988), 88 Ill. App. 3d 543, 43 111. Dec. 782, 410 N.E.2d 915. A court, in exercising its equitable powers, should look to substance and not to form.

Roth v. Carlyle Real Estate, Ltd. (1st Dist. 1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 433, 84 Ill. Dec. 699, 472 N.E.2d 836. Courts will not be misled by mere devices and subterfuges, but will disregard names and penetrate disguises to discover the substance of an act or transgression.

Central Production Credit Assoc. v. Hans (2nd Dist. 1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 889, 137 Ill. Dec. 302, 545 N.E.2d 1063. Equity will not allow a person to benefit from a fraud.

Runion v. Industrial Commission. (5th Dist. 1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 470, 185 Ill. Dec. 713, 615 N.E.2d 8, While Illinois recognizes mental incapacity resulting from work-related injury as compensable, psychological problems must be the result of a sudden, severe emotional shock. Recovery for non-traumatically induced mental illness limited to establishment of factors: 1) disorder arose in situation of greater dimensions than day-to-day emotional strain experienced by all employees; 2) the conditions exist from an objective standpoint; 3) employment conditions, compared with non-employment conditions, were "major contributory cause" of the mental disorder. 185 Ill. Dec. at 715. See also, Catastrophe v. Industrial Commission (4th Dist, 1993), 185 I11. Dec. 339, 614 N.E.2d 473 for an example of traumatic incident, falling and hitting head, resulted in deteriorating mental condition, among other symptoms. Causal relationship between condition and employment was demonstrable.